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Patent claim construction is a mess. The Federal Circuit’s failure to
provide adequate guidance has created significant problems for the
patent system.  The problems with claim construction result from the
Federal Circuit’s inability to resolve whether claim terms should be
given (1) the general, acontextual meaning they would have to a skilled
person in the field; (2) the specific meaning they have in the context of
the patent; or (3) some combination of the two. The claim construction
debate largely overlooks the generalist judges who must implement
claim construction.  This Article fills that gap, concluding that existing
approaches are difficult, costly, and error prone for generalist judges
because they force the judge to step into the shoes of a scientist. It is
time to abandon the legal fiction that claims should be construed from
the perspective of a skilled person in the field—instead, judges should
construe claims from the perspective of an ordinary reader discerning
meaning from the context of the patent. The ordinary reader standard
is more familiar to generalist judges, easier and cheaper to apply, and
less error prone. Perhaps surprisingly, it is also consistent with the
nature of claim construction. Rather than eliminate technical context,
an ordinary reader standard focuses on the technical context that was
provided by the patentee, is publicly available to everyone, and by defi-
nition reflects the skill level, field, and time of the invention. And,
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rather than ignore the audience for patent claims, it provides a com-
mon ground for the varied consumers of modern patent claims: skilled
people, business people, patent examiners, lawyers, and judges.
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INTRODUCTION
To overcome problems resulting from file format incompatibilities be-
tween IBM PCs and Apple Macs in 1990, three inventors conceived of a
digital camera that allowed the user to select, before taking a picture,
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whether to save the image in a PC-compatible format, a Mac-compatible
format, or a format compatible with another manufacturer’s computer.1
Though apparently useful at the time, the development of standardized im-
age formats, like the now-ubiquitous JPEG, rendered this invention obsolete
shortly after the inventors’ first patent issued in 1992.2
Yet, over a ten-year period beginning in 2001, the owners of the inven-
tors’ patents, a patent assertion entity named St. Clair Intellectual Property
Consultants, sued virtually every significant provider of digital cameras or
camera phones.3  St. Clair convinced the district court to adopt a broad inter-
pretation of the patent claims that “cover[ed] electronic cameras that can
save digital photographs in one of at least two file formats,” including stan-
dardized formats compatible with any type of computer.4 In doing so, the
district court relied on the supposed “ordinary and accustomed meaning” of
the claim terms, rather than the inventors’ description of their invention in
the patent.5 Under this construction, the patents covered any product that
captured both still pictures and video,6 and St. Clair obtained jury verdicts of
$25 million, $34.7 million, and $3 million, as well as hundreds of millions
of dollars in revenues from litigation-driven licenses.7
More than eight years after the district court adopted this broad interpre-
tation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed
and rejected it. Relying on the patent’s description of the invention, rather
than the claims’ “ordinary meaning,” to interpret the claim language, the
Federal Circuit held that the patent claims were limited to a camera that
offered two or more still image formats each specific to a particular type of
computer.8 Under this construction, none of the modern products accused by
1. See St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc., 412 F. App’x 270, 273-74
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
2. See Complaint for Patent Infringement Corrected Brief for Defendants-Appellants at
15, St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., 412 F. App’x 270 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 2009-1052, 2010-1137, -1140) [hereinafter Fujifilm Fed. Cir. Br.]; see also U.S. Patent
No. 5,138,459 (filed Nov. 20, 1990).
3. Complaint for Patent Infringement at 3-5, St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v.
Google, Inc. (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2010) (No. 1:10-cv-00077-UNA) [hereinafter St. Clair Google
Complaint].
4. See St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Sony Corp., No. 01-557-JJF, 2002 WL
31051605, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2002).
5. Id.
6. See Fujifilm Fed. Cir. Br., supra note 2, at 20-21.
7. Robert J. Gaybrick & Robert J. Hollingshead, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Fighting the Patent Troll at Shanghai Silicon IP Exchange, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 10
(Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/fightingpatenttroll_gaybrick
hollingshead20070927.pdf; see St. Clair Google Complaint, supra note 3, at 3-5.
8. St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc., 412 F. App’x 270, 277-78
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
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St. Clair violated the patent.9 Aside from the $3 million verdict under appeal,
the Federal Circuit’s opinion could not undo the verdicts, license fees, or
litigation costs that had burdened both the camera and camera phone indus-
tries as a result of the district court’s broad interpretation.
The St. Clair litigation is not an outlier. The academic literature and
popular press recount stories of overbroad patents asserted widely to sweep
in independently-developed products much different from that described in
the patent.10 Scholars have gone to great lengths to propose ways to elimi-
nate so-called “bad patents,”11 either by improving examination in the Patent
Office or eliminating patents in litigation.12 However, in many cases—ar-
guably including St. Clair’s—the patents may not be inherently “bad”;
rather, they may describe actual innovations that are narrow, economically
trivial, or now obsolete. The problem comes when patentees exploit vague-
ness or ambiguities in claim language to broadly assert patents that were
understood narrowly when issued by the Patent Office.13
For that reason, the interpretation of patent claims, known as claim con-
struction, is “overwhelmingly the most critical patent issue in litigation.”14
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s claim construction precedent is an un-
mitigated disaster, causing ex ante unpredictability before litigation,15 ex
post uncertainty in litigation,16 appellate panel dependence,17 high reversal
rates,18 conflicting interpretive approaches,19 overly broad claim scope,20 un-
9. See id. at 278; St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Nos. 04-1436-LPS, 06-404-LPS, 08–371–LPS, 2012 WL 1015993, at *11-14 (D. Del. Mar.
26, 2012).
10. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREUCRATS, & LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 4-5 (2008); Charles Duhigg & Steve
Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1.
11. Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, 28 REG. 10 (Winter 2005-
2006).
12. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 71, 87-93 (2013) (summarizing literature).
13. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 56-58.
14. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?  Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY & THE COMMON LAW 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
15. See Jennifer R. Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of Lan-
guage, and the Search for Ordinary Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 528 (2004); Kristen Osenga,
Linguistics & Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 64 (2006).
16. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27-28 (2001).
17. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1169 (2004).
18. Moore, supra note 16, at 27-28.
19. See Osenga, supra note 15, at 69-71.
20. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?  Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1762 (2009).
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due formalism,21 increased litigation,22 disincentives to settle,23 and high liti-
gation costs.24 Two leading commentators have identified the Federal
Circuit’s confused claim construction precedent as one of the primary causes
of the “failure” of the patent system.25
The root of these problems is a fundamental split in the Federal Circuit
over the methodology for claim construction. The various formulations that
have been used to describe this split overshadow a core question at its heart,
rarely directly acknowledged in the cases or scholarship: whether claim
terms should be given the general meaning they would normally have to a
skilled person in the field of the invention, the specific meaning that they
have in the context of the patent itself, or some combination of the two. Put
another way, Federal Circuit judges are divided over the proper context for
interpreting the patent claims—the background knowledge and understand-
ing in the field, the disclosure in the patent itself, or both.
One line of cases and scholarship emphasizes that because claim terms
are interpreted from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention (“skilled person” or “PHOSITA”), the pre-
sumed audience for patents, they almost always should be given their acon-
textual general meaning to that person.26 A competing line of thought agrees
that judges interpret claim terms from the skilled person’s perspective, but
this view assumes that such a skilled person would reconcile her general
knowledge and understanding with the specific context provided by the pat-
ent.27 In recent years, a third approach has developed in the cases and schol-
arship that rejects any reliance on the acontextual general meaning a term
would have in the field. Instead, this approach contends that terms should be
given the meaning that captures the patentee’s actual invention from the spe-
cific context of the patent.28  Each of these approaches purports to promote
one or both of two values: predictability in patent scope, and proportionality
between patent scope and the patentee’s contribution to the field.
Predictability and proportionality in patent scope derive from the eco-
nomic justifications for the patent system and undoubtedly are important
principles for patent claim construction. Yet identifying an optimal approach
to claim construction is not as simple as determining how best in theory to
promote one or both of these values. In the context of constitutional and
statutory interpretation—equally applicable to patent interpretation—Adrian
21. Id. at 1745.
22. See Moore, supra note 16, at 27-28.
23. Burk & Lemley, supra note 16, at 53; Moore, supra note 16, at 27-28.
24. Moore, supra note 16, at 27-28.
25. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 10, 57-58.
26. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 144.
27. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
28. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 44 (2012).
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Vermeule has concluded that “[t]he right question is not ‘How, in principle,
should a legal text be interpreted?’ The question instead is ‘How should
certain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret
certain texts?’”29 To date, the claim construction debate largely has over-
looked this crucial question: how should legally—but not technically—so-
phisticated generalist judges interpret patent claims?
From this perspective, requiring the judge to determine the general
meaning of a claim term to a skilled person at the time of the invention is
destined to be costly and error prone, undermining both predictability and
proportionality.30 To accurately determine the skilled person’s general
knowledge and understanding at the time the invention was made, a general-
ist judge must resolve a series of difficult scientific questions, such as the
precise field of the invention, the precise level of skill in the field, the
knowledge possessed by a skilled person in the field, and the sources availa-
ble to such a person. Often, the judge must make these determinations years
after the time of the invention. The judge also must distinguish the skilled
person’s understanding from the judge’s own, avoid attributing knowledge
of subsequent developments to the skilled person, and separate the parties’
self-serving assertions about the technology from the reality at the time of
the invention.
In light of these difficulties, it is not surprising that some recent opinions
and commentary have deemphasized the general meaning of claim terms in
the field at the time of the invention. Instead, these opinions and articles
emphasize the meaning in the specific context of the patent.  However, the
patent-specific meaning that this line has adopted—the meaning that will
best capture the patentee’s so-called actual invention—does not make claim
construction any better suited for generalist judges. It requires generalist
judges to define the patentee’s “invention” at a precise level of generality
and to do so based on the varied, confusing, and often conflicting patent
disclosure. The generalist judge then still must identify a claim meaning that
captures exactly this “actual invention,” nothing more or less.
The opinions and commentary that favor construing claims to reflect the
patentee’s “actual invention,” as determined from the specific context of the
patent, have it half right. Claim construction should focus on the specific
meaning in the patent disclosure, rather than the general acontextual mean-
ing to a skilled person at the time of the invention. However, to make claim
construction less costly, more constrained, and less error prone, a generalist
judge should give a claim term the meaning that an ordinary reader would
understand from how the specific claim term is used in the public record of
the patent and prosecution history. This approach is simpler, more familiar,
29. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 36 (2006).
30. See infra Part III.
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and better suited for legally—but not technically—sophisticated generalist
judges.
Abandoning the skilled person’s perspective in favor of an ordinary
reader standard promotes the objectives of claim construction as well as, or
better than, the idealized approaches. Rather than eliminating technical con-
text, it promotes proportionality by relying only on the technical context
indisputably related to the invention that is provided in the public record of
the patent and prosecution history. It also promotes predictability by provid-
ing common ground for the varied consumers of patent claims: skilled peo-
ple, business people, patent examiners, lawyers, and judges.  Although there
may be concerns about whether judges can identify claim term meaning just
from the use of the term in the patent itself, mechanisms exist in the Patent
Office rules to ensure that patentees sufficiently describe claim terms in the
patent specification.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces patents and patent
claim construction for the uninitiated reader. Part II describes the Federal
Circuit’s persistent split over the relative roles in claim construction of the
general meaning of claim terms in the technical field and the specific mean-
ing terms bear in the patent itself. Part III evaluates general meaning ap-
proaches and finds them poorly suited for application by generalist judges.
Part IV first evaluates the actual invention approach and finds it similarly
poorly matched for the skills of generalist judges.  Part IV then proposes the
alternative ordinary reader approach and explains why it is both better suited
for generalist judges and normatively desirable. A short conclusion follows.
I. PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Interpreting a patent claim is similar in many ways to interpreting a
statute, contract, or other legal document. Courts and scholars addressing
patent claim construction have sometimes looked to the interpretive rules
and interpretive debates from these other contexts,31 though probably not as
much as they should.32 At the same time, a patent includes unique features
not easily analogized to other legal documents and claim construction has
developed its own language, theories, and rules. A brief primer on patents
and patent claim construction follows.
31. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (statutory interpretation); id. at 997 (Mayer, J.,
concurring in judgment) (contract and deed interpretation); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2000) (contract and statutory
interpretation).
32. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What
Ought We to Expect, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 835 (2010).
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A. The Anatomy of a Patent
A United States patent has two primary parts: the written description
and the claims. The Patent Act expressly connects these two parts, explain-
ing that the patent “specification shall contain a written description of the
invention” and “shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint
inventor regards as the invention.”33 Although both parts are directed at the
“invention,” their content and function are significantly different.
1. The Specification
The written description, commonly referred to by the more generic term
specification,34 is “rich with invention-specific information,”35 including: a
description of “the precise invention” at various levels of generality, the ex-
isting knowledge and work in the technological field (known as “prior art”)
and how the invention differs from it, working examples (known as “embod-
iments”), how to make and use the invention, and the best way the patentee
knows of building or implementing the invention (known as the “best
mode”).36 The extensive information provided in the specification is the
“quid pro quo” that justifies the exclusive rights granted by the patent.37
The patent begins with a title that describes the “invention” at a high
level of generality in a “brief but technically accurate and descriptive”
way.38 The cover page also includes an abstract of the disclosure that con-
cisely summarizes the technical disclosure and the innovative aspects of the
invention.39 Several illustrations—detailed figures, diagrammatic views,
chemical or mathematical formulas, tables, or flow charts—normally follow
the cover page to help “facilitate an understanding of the invention.”40
These illustrations may be of the “invention,” but they also may illustrate
specific working examples or show existing devices for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing the invention from the prior art. The following is an example
from the St. Clair patent:41
33. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)-(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies &
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 61 n.29 (2005).
35. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation & Information Costs, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 57, 70 (2005).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (2013); see Cotropia, supra note 35, at 69-
70. But cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 1097, 1118 (2011) (suggesting that the specification only describes a “tangible and work-
ing embodiment” of the invention).
37. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F. 3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548-53 (2009).
38. MPEP § 606 (8th ed., Rev. 9, Aug. 2012).
39. Id. § 608.01(b)(B).
40. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.81(b), 1.84(d); Cotropia, supra note 35, at 70-72.
41. U.S. Patent No. 5,138,459 fig. 14A (filed Nov. 20, 1990).
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The core of the specification starts with a “Background of the Inven-
tion” identifying the technical field of the invention, the problem in the field
that the invention addresses, existing knowledge about this problem, and
prior attempts to solve it.42 The following excerpts from the Background of
the St. Clair patent are representative:
This invention generally relates to an electronic still video camera
and in particular to an improved electronic still camera which con-
verts a still picture of an object or scene into an operator selectable
compressed digital signal format for storage utilizing a compres-
sion/decompression algorithm, such as the Joint Photographic Ex-
perts Group (JPEG) algorithm standard for example, formatted into
Personal Computer (PC) compatible format retaining the images’
color information, and stored on a PC compatible memory
diskette. . . .
42. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b); MPEP supra note 38, § 608.01(c).
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With the current state of the art, it is expensive and time consuming
to convert the analog image equivalent to a digital format for direct
utilization with PC software applications.43
The Background is followed by a “Summary of the Invention” setting
forth “the nature and gist of the invention or the inventive concept.”44 The
“Summary of the Invention” often describes the “objects” of the invention,
which are the reasons that the invention is useful, and/or the key features of
the invention, which are either described as features of the “present inven-
tion” or as only features of an “aspect” or “embodiment.”45 Again, the fol-
lowing excerpt from the St. Clair patent is representative:
It is the object of this invention to provide an improved electronic
still camera with operator selectable picture compression in one of a
plurality of operator selectable digital data formats recordable on a
standard removeable magnetic diskette common to personal
computers.
It is a further object of this invention to provide an improved elec-
tronic still camera that provides digital image files for immediate
and direct incorporation into popular word processing, desktop pub-
lishing, and other software programs on PCs.46
The “Detailed Description of Invention” composes the bulk of the speci-
fication.47 The Detailed Description describes the invention in “such particu-
larity as to enable any person skilled in the pertinent art or science to make
and use the invention without involving extensive experimentation.”48  It
often includes details about materials, manufacturing or chemical processes,
experiments, etc.49 It also must describe completely a specific working ex-
ample, or embodiment, of the invention, and it often has several such exam-
ples that describe different features or components or different commercial
or industrial applications.50  One of these examples normally also satisfies
the requirement that the inventor disclose the “best mode,” or best way, of
carrying out the invention, which often requires detailed information about
dimensions, tools, preferred materials, etc.51
43. U.S. Patent No. 5,138,459 col. 1 ll. 8-60 (filed Nov. 20, 1990).
44. MPEP, supra note 38, §§ 608.01(a) ¶ 6.02(g), 608.01(d).
45. MPEP, supra note 38, § 608.01(d).
46. U.S. Patent No. 5,138,459 col. 2 ll. 9-19.
47. MPEP, supra note 38, § 608.01(g).
48. Id.
49. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 76-77.
50. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (2013).
51. Id. Congress recently amended the best mode requirement as part of the America
Invents Act.  Applicants must continue to disclose the best mode they know of carrying out the
invention, but failure to do so is no longer a ground for patent invalidity in subsequent litiga-
tion.  Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
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Thus, the patent specification is full of useful technical information
about the invention.52 At the same time, it is “sanitized, modulated, or other-
wise transformed by the legal pencil,” resulting in a “jumble of legal and
technical assertions, making it excessively hard for the technical expert to
comprehend the invention’s technical aspects through the patent.”53 The
specification will often use “broad or ambiguous phrasings to maximize the
probability of extensive patent protection in the face of ever-changing tech-
nological conditions.”54 Relatedly, the patentee may use specialized termi-
nology, called “patentese,” developed by patent prosecutors to cast the
invention in broad terms and avoid poor word choices that have unintended
consequences.55 Ultimately, “patentees rationally have little to no incentive
to offer more information than the patent laws require and have an incentive
to obfuscate information they provide whenever possible.”56 Doing so limits
competitors’ efforts to design around the patent, develop improvements, or
practice the invention after the patent expires.
2. The Claims
The patent ends with one or more “claims” that “particularly point[ ] out
and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”57 “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims define
the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”58  In
doing so, claims perform two closely related functions. First, they substan-
tively define the patentee’s right to exclude, so that the patentee has no
rights except that which falls within the scope of the claims.59 Second, they
provide public notice of the exact boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive
rights, so that, in theory, the public can read the claims and know what
activities are reserved to the patentee and what remain open to the public.60
125, 126-27 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/
articles/64-SLRO-125.pdf.
52. See Cotropia, supra note 35, at 84-85.
53. Fromer, supra note 37, at 567-68; Sean B. Seymour, The Teaching Function of
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 638-39 (2010).
54. Fromer, supra note 37, at 568.
55. Seymour, supra note 53, at 633-38 (giving the example of a patent that described
the simple scientific concept of “a primary or secondary alcohol” as “an alcohol having at least
one hydrogen atom attached to the carbon atom bearing the hydroxyl substituent to the corre-
sponding carbonyl compound”).
56. Fromer, supra note 37, at 552-53.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
58. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See Cotropia, supra note 34, at 65.
60. See id. at 62-65.
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Claims are numbered, single sentences—though often long and convo-
luted—that summarize the invention for which protection is sought.61  A
claim normally starts with a preamble that describes the type of invention
(device, process, system, diagnostic, etc.) or the technical field of the inven-
tion and then includes a list of several “elements” or “limitations,” which are
the steps or parts that the patentee considers necessary to its invention.62 The
patent normally includes several claims, which may vary in scope by includ-
ing more or fewer limitations or vary in the words or structure they use to
express and describe the invention.63 By doing so, the patentee can both
maximize the reach of its patent and protect itself by increasing the chances
that at least one of the claims will cover a competitor’s product and not
encroach on the prior art. The following claim from the St. Clair patent is
representative:
For use in an electronic camera having an image pick-up unit and a
storage device, a process for taking and storing digital pictures, the
process comprising:
selecting one of a plurality of computer image file formats in the
camera;
generating a digital image signal corresponding to an image incident
on the image pick-up unit;
formatting the digital image signal in the selected computer image
file format; and
storing the formatted computer image file in the storage device.
Claims are even more difficult to understand than the specification.
Claims must describe complex and extensive technical concepts in a single
sentence and therefore naturally use shorthand, general terminology, and in-
complete descriptions, as well as unusual and difficult to follow structures.64
Moreover, because claims describe technical content but have legal effect,
they are often “an amalgam of multiple vocabularies and perspectives,” us-
ing ordinary English, conventions of claim drafting (i.e., “patentese”), and
scientific or technical words.65 Patentees have the incentive to exacerbate
these inherent difficulties by using vague and ambiguous terminology,
which can be read narrowly to avoid the prior art when obtaining the patent
61. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY:
CASES & MATERIALS 26, 29 (5th ed. 2011).
62. See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 90-
91 (5th ed. 2011).
63. See id. at 91.
64. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 762
(2009).
65. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Struc-
tured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 720 (2010).
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and broadly to cover a competitor’s product in subsequent licensing negotia-
tions or litigation.66 There is near-universal consensus that patent claims fail
to adequately perform their public notice function,67 either because of inher-
ent difficulties in “peripheral claiming,” i.e., using words to define the outer
boundaries of the patentee’s rights,68 or inadequate guidance on claim
construction.69
3. Patent Prosecution
To obtain a patent, an inventor must file a patent application with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”). The patent
application is usually written by a registered patent attorney (known as a
“patent prosecutor”). A patent prosecutor normally has a technical back-
ground, though his or her background may be in a different technical field
than the invention and frequently will not be as extensive as people actually
working in the field of the invention.70 The prosecutor drafts the specifica-
tion and claims with the input of the inventor.71 Because the specification is
directed more to a technical description of the invention, the inventor often
plays an important role in the drafting of the specification. On the other
hand, patent claims are legal creatures whose primary function is to demar-
cate legal boundaries. Therefore, the patent prosecutor—as a lawyer in-
volved in the drafting process—will often have near-sole control over the
drafting of the claims.72
The patent application is reviewed by a Patent Office examiner to deter-
mine whether it satisfies the statutory requirements for a patent. The exam-
iner normally has some background in at least the general field of the
invention but likely less than people actively working in the field.73 In par-
ticular, the examiner will determine whether the invention disclosed in the
patent application is an advance over the prior art and whether the patent
application provides sufficient disclosure of the invention.74 Following a de-
tailed set of procedures, directions, and guidance contained in the Manual of
Patent Examing Procedure, the examiner often will issue one or more “Of-
66. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 56-57; Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at
1753.
67. Fromer, supra note 61, at 762.
68. See id. at 731-32; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 20.
69. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 58.
70. See Menell et al., supra note 65, at 719.
71. See id. In corporate settings, a technical advisor will often be involved as well.  The
technical advisor normally will have more familiarity with the field of the invention than the
prosecutor but probably less than people actively working in the field.
72. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive
Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321,
369-70 (2008).
73. See Menell et al., supra note 65, at 720.
74. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2012).
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fice Actions” finding the invention unpatentable either because the disclo-
sure is insufficient or, more commonly, because it is too close to the prior
art.75 The patent prosecutor will then provide a “Response,” which explains
why the invention is a sufficient advance over the prior art to warrant a
patent.76 The prosecutor frequently also will amend the claims to narrow or
clarify them in a way designed to distinguish the prior art identified by the
examiner.77 Normally, the specification is not amended after the filing of the
patent application because, if it is, any activities between when the patent
application was filed and the amendment was made, including those by the
applicant, can be used as prior art to show that the draft patent does not
describe a sufficient enough advance.78 All of these documents exchanged
during patent prosecution—referred to as the “file-wrapper” or “prosecution
history”—are made publicly available when the patent issues (now for free
on the Patent Office’s website79) and are part of the patent’s public record.
B. Interpreting Patent Claims
1. The Importance of Claim Construction
Patent claims, like the words of other legal documents, require signifi-
cant interpretation to perform their legal functions.80 Indeed, interpretation
of claim language may be even more crucial than interpretation of language
in other legal documents because of the difficulties of translating complex
technical concepts into brief, legal shorthand, as well as the patentee’s incen-
tives to use the broadest, vaguest, and most ambiguous language possible.81
Claim construction is required before a court can resolve the key issues
in any patent case, including whether a competitor’s product falls within the
patentee’s exclusive rights (“infringes” in patent terminology)82 or whether
the patent is “invalid” for failing to be sufficiently novel and nonobvious to
advance over the prior art83 or provide adequate disclosure to satisfy the quid
75. See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 62, at 105.
76. See id. at 106.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Patent Application Information Retrieval, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://
portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
80. William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The
Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 336
(2009).
81. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-97 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
82. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
83. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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pro quo for the exclusive rights.84 Claim construction also is a threshold step
to virtually every other patent issue.85
Claim construction can be case dispositive, such as when the parties’
real dispute is not how the competitor’s product operates or what existed in
the field before the invention, but rather whether the patent claim reaches the
competitor’s product or extends beyond the prior art.86 Even if not com-
pletely dispositive, claim construction tends to be case determinative by lim-
iting the issues for summary judgment or trial, increasing settlement
prospects through a narrower range of possible case evaluations, and
strengthening the position of one party at the expense of the other.
Claims also must be construed by a variety of actors outside of litiga-
tion: patent examiners deciding whether to grant a patent; competitors decid-
ing whether to proceed with a product, seek a license, or design around the
patent; subsequent researchers determining whether a specific improvement
or research trail remains open; patentees determining whether to make a pat-
ent assertion or bring an infringement action; and investors investing in the
patentee or a potential infringer.87 The legal rules for claim construction de-
veloped in litigation, at least in theory, will affect these actors’ conclusions
about claim scope and their resulting activities.
2. Claim Construction Rules
The Constitution, Patent Act, and Supreme Court precedent provide lit-
tle, if any, guidance as to how to interpret patent claims.88 Rather, the task of
84. Atl. Research Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Troy, 659 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (writ-
ten description); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en-
ablement); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(best mode).
85. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (statutory subject matter); AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l
S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (impermissible claim enlargement during reissue);
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (but-for materiality for inequitable conduct); iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (exceptional case and attorney’s fees); Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters
Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (willful infringement); Trovan, Ltd. v. Sokymat
SA, 299 F.3d 1292, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (inventorship); Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v.
United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indefiniteness); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (double patenting); Raytheon Co. v. Roper
Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (inoperability).
86. See Cotropia, supra note 34, at 67; see, e.g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal
Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (infringement verdict challenged
just on claim construction); Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173,
1177 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (district court claim construction led to stipulated judgment of non-
infringement).
87. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 125; see Moore, supra note 16, at 5;
Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form & Substance in Claim Construction, 59
FLA. L. REV. 333, 336 (2007).
88. See Cotropia, supra note 34, at 71.
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defining an approach to interpreting patent claims has been left to the Fed-
eral Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. The
Federal Circuit summarized its precedent in the 2005 en banc decision in
Phillips v. AWH Corporation, which has been widely criticized for failing to
clarify claim construction standards and adopting an “anything goes”
approach.89
Under this approach, claim terms are given their “ordinary and custom-
ary meaning” to a reasonable specialist in the technological field of the in-
vention—referred to as the “person having ordinary skill in the art” or
“PHOSITA” in patent terminology—because inventors are typically persons
skilled in the field of the invention and patents are addressed to and intended
to be read by other skilled people in the field.90 But the Federal Circuit em-
phasized that this “ordinary and customary meaning” to a skilled person was
not necessarily the skilled person’s background, general understanding of
the term because the skilled person “is deemed to read the claim term . . . in
the context of the entire patent, including the specification.”91 Phillips identi-
fied four possible sources for interpreting patent claims.
First, the claim language itself is crucial to claim construction.  Like any
interpretive task, claim construction begins with the actual words being in-
terpreted.  In some cases, it also ends there, because a skilled person would
share the “widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words” that is
“readily apparent even to lay judges.”92 But these will be unusual cases be-
cause the meaning to a skilled person “is often not immediately apparent” in
cases that result in litigation.93 Moreover, because a judge is not herself a
skilled person in the field, the judge cannot even be confident that a skilled
person would actually understand what appears to be a “commonly under-
stood word” consistent with the “widely accepted meaning.”94 For example,
would a skilled person understand the term “body” in a retractable needle
patent to be used consistent with its ordinary English meaning, or to be used
in a specialized way in the field of needle technology?95
Beyond the actual words being interpreted, the remainder of the claim at
issue, and other claims in the patent, are useful in claim construction because
they provide relevant context under familiar linguistic canons used to inter-
89. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); e.g., Osenga,
supra note 15, at 72, 80, 82; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 130.
90. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 1314.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. E.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rader, J., dissenting) (assuming “body” had ordinary English meaning with-
out considering whether any technical meaning existed in field of invention).
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pret any legal document or written communication.96 For example, courts
should adopt certain presumptions: that different words or phrases have dif-
ferent meanings; that terms are used consistently in different claims; and that
the inclusion of additional requirements in one claim means that those re-
quirements are not present in other claims where they are not expressly re-
cited (“claim differentiation” in patent terminology).97
Second, courts should read claim terms in light of the written description
of the invention in the specification, which “is always highly relevant to the
claim construction analysis,” is usually “dispositive,” and “is the single best
guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”98 The Federal Circuit cited the
specification in construing over 80% of terms in recent years.99 The exact
role of the specification in claim construction remains a contentious issue,
despite the strong language in Phillips.100
Third, Phillips held that a court should consider a patent’s prosecution
history if it is in evidence.101 Yet the prosecution history was only referenced
for 46.9% of terms that the Federal Circuit construed in the years before
Phillips and 37.1% in the years since.102 The decrease in usage of the prose-
cution history is consistent with the view in Phillips that the prosecution
history often lacks clarity and is less useful for claim construction because it
“represents an ongoing negotiation between the [Patent Office] and the ap-
plicant.”103 Under the doctrine of “prosecution disclaimer,” the prosecution
history can narrow the meaning the claim term would otherwise have when
the patentee made “clear and unmistakable” statements during prosecution to
avoid the prior art and obtain the patent.104 Phillips described an additional,
96. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[2][B][iii] (2013), avaiable at
LexisNexis; see generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTER-
PRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
97. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-15; CHISUM, supra note 96, § 18.03[2][b][iii][A].
98. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The specification sometimes has been compared to statutory
legislative history, even though the claims are statutorily part of the specification and therefore
part of the same “fully integrated written instrument.” Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). The better anal-
ogy is to other parts of the same statute, which, under the “whole-text canon” in statutory
interpretation, are important context because the interpretation of a term must be “compatible
with the use of the same word or phrase elsewhere in the statute.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 96, at 167-70.
99. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, Empirical,
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction,  108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 44 (2013).
100. See infra Part II.A.
101. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 980).
102. Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 44.
103. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 45.
104. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
260 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:243
more general use for the prosecution history: to show how the inventor un-
derstood and used a claim term.105
Fourth, the court can consider evidence external to the patent and prose-
cution history, such as dictionaries, treatises, prior art, and expert testimony,
to provide the background information about the technical field and the ter-
minology in that field or to show that a term has a particular established
meaning in the field.106 The Federal Circuit referenced extrinsic evidence in
construing 33.2% of terms before Phillips and 26.3% since Phillips, with
expert testimony referenced for 8.8-12.1% of terms.107 The Federal Circuit’s
decreased usage of extrinsic evidence after Phillips is consistent with the
warning in Phillips that extrinsic evidence, especially expert testimony, can
be unreliable and is significantly less important than the intrinsic evidence of
the claims, specification, and prosecution history.108 Phillips thus rejected an
approach to claim construction that started with an “ordinary meaning” of a
claim term derived from dictionaries, treatises, or other extrinsic sources and
only then looked to the specification for the limited purpose of finding an
express definition, disclaimer, or other rebuttal of this “ordinary
meaning.”109
Phillips cautioned that expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence is
created, or selected from a wide range of possible sources of marginal rele-
vance, for purposes of litigation.110 Moreover, extrinsic sources may not be
written by or for people with the precise skill level or in the precise field of
the patent, nor are experts always at the precise skill level in the precise field
of the patent.111 Extrinsic evidence also may not be consistent with the way
that language is used in the public record of the patent and prosecution
history.112
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION SPLIT
A. A Division Over General or Specific Meaning
Commentators have long recognized a methodological split in the Fed-
eral Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence.113  Even Federal Circuit
judges have acknowledged a “fundamental split” as to whether claims are
105. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317; see also, e.g., St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v.
Canon Inc., 412 F. App’x 270, 276-77 (Fed. Cir. 2011); id. at 280 (Moore, J., dissenting)
(relying on how term was used during prosecution even though “St. Clair did not clearly
disavow claim scope”).
106. Id. at 1317-18.
107. Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 45-47.
108. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18.
109. Id. at 1320.
110. Id. at 1318.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1318-19.
113. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 31 (describing split in 2000).
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generally given their “plain and ordinary meaning” or whether they are
“redefine[d] . . . to match . . . the scope of the invention as disclosed in the
specification.”114  The Federal Circuit granted en banc review in Phillips to
resolve this split.115 Unfortunately, Phillips attempted to reconcile all prior
cases, rather than overruling one of the competing lines, and thus can be read
as supporting either side of the methodological split.116 A recent empirical
study confirms that the Federal Circuit’s precedent is as divided today as
before Phillips.117
The Federal Circuit’s claim construction split has been described in a
variety of ways: whether intrinsic or extrinsic evidence provides greater cer-
tainty and predictability,118 whether the claims should be limited to the in-
vention disclosed in the specification,119 whether the dictionary or the
specification is the best place to identify the “ordinary and customary mean-
ing” of a term,120 whether claim construction should be formalistic or holis-
tic,121 and whether the canon that claims must be read in light of the
specification should trump the canon against importing limitations from the
specification into the claims or vice versa.122
Though largely unrecognized in the scholarship,123 the core question
uniting all of these various descriptions is whether claim terms should be
given the general meaning they normally possess in the field of the invention
or the specific meaning with which they are used in the patent itself.124 In
other words, the claim construction debate is over the proper context for
114. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
115. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
116. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 130; Compare On Demand Machine
Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (contextual) with Re-
tractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371-72 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for
rehearing en banc) (ordinary  meaning).
117. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14.
118. See Nard, supra note 31, at 7-10, 47.
119. See Cotropia, supra note 34, at 105-15.
120. See Osenga, supra note 15, at 77.
121. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 17, at 1133-34.
122. Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855,
1906 (2012).
123. But see Cotropia, supra note 34, at 114 (noting that claim-centric methodology
“moves the claim term’s meaning from the context of the patent to the abstract”); Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 17, at 1134 (referencing a dichotomy between “the abstracted ‘ordi-
nary meaning’ of a term” and “a more localized understanding”).
124. Professors Chiang and Solum have recently suggested that the claim construction
split does not result from uncertainty about linguistic meaning but rather diverging policy
goals. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in
Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2234193. Chiang and Solum overlook the linguistic disagreement over
whether the proper context for the claim construction is general knowledge in the field, the
patent itself, or some combination of the two. Id. at 18-19, 34.
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interpreting patent claims: the background knowledge and understanding of
skilled people in the field,125 the description of the invention in the specifica-
tion,126 or some combination of both127?
One line of cases and scholarship increasingly favors limiting the con-
text for claim construction to the general meaning to a skilled person in the
field of the invention. Under this view, a judge should consult the specifica-
tion only in very limited circumstances.128 Rather, claim terms “must be
given” their ordinary meaning to skilled person in the field at the time of the
invention,129 or at least they bear a “heavy presumption” in favor of such
meaning,130 with recent cases emphasizing that this is a “plain,” or abstract,
meaning.131 Before Phillips rejected extrinsic evidence as the starting point
for claim construction,132 the ordinary meaning was derived from dictiona-
ries, treatises, or other similar extrinsic sources.133  Since Phillips, this line
generally starts just with the judge’s own understanding, without any effort
to corroborate this understanding with contemporaneous sources in the field
of the invention.134  The judge then only consults the specification to deter-
mine whether the specification satisfies the “exacting” standard for two
“quite narrow” exceptions to ordinary meaning: where the patentee “clearly
set forth” an express definition or used “expressions of manifest exclusion or
125. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
126. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
127. Nard, supra note 31, at 48-49.
128. E.g., Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent’mt Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365-67 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 143-44.
129. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367; see also, e.g., Interdigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the
petition for rehearing en banc); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d
1296, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rader, J. dissenting).
130. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1999); see also, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-05 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
131. E.g., Thorner 669 F.3d at 1365.
132. See supra Part I.B.2.
133. Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202-05.
134. E.g., In re Rambus, Inc., 694 F.3d 42 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (2012) (“mem-
ory device” in computer technology); Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367 (“attached” in video game
console design); Retractable, 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“body” in medical syr-
inges); St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc., 412 F. App’x. 270, 278 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“plurality of different data formats” in camera technology);
Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“spring metal adaptor” in electrical connectors); Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dep’t
Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Linn, J., dissenting) (“remote interface” in
financial data processing system); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., 317 Fed. Appx.
982, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“plug” in intravenous medical devices); Acumed LLC v. Stryker
Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“curved shank” in orthopedic devices).
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restriction” that clearly and unmistakably disclaimed claim scope.135  Al-
though earlier “ordinary meaning” cases also consulted the specification
when multiple “ordinary” meanings were found in extrinsic sources,136 re-
cent opinions now suggest that the court should adopt the broadest of the
possible “ordinary” meanings.137
Tying claim construction to the general meaning in the field of the in-
vention is said to promote predictability and public notice. For example,
Professors Wagner and Petherbridge contend that “embrac[ing] the com-
monly-understood meaning of words [in the field], and plac[ing] the burden
on the patent applicant to clearly explain any deviations” will ensure that
“the meaning of claim language is readily apparent to patent readers.”138
Predictability of patent rights, like any property right,139 is crucial to permit
planning140 and to avoid inefficiencies from unintentional infringement that
could have been cheaply avoided, omission of productive activities unpro-
tected by the patent, payment of unnecessary royalties, and expensive litiga-
tion and missed settlement opportunities.141
A second line of cases and scholarship increasingly limits claim con-
struction to the specific meaning in the context of the patent, regardless of
how a term is otherwise used in the field of invention. Traditionally, this line
has treated the specification as a dictionary that can define claim terms either
expressly or implicitly.142 Thus, “the specification is always highly relevant
to the claim construction analysis.  Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”143 Under this approach, ex-
trinsic evidence is rarely consulted and, if it is, cannot justify a broader con-
struction than can be derived just from the intrinsic evidence.144  Recent
opinions and scholarship in this line have gone beyond just using the specifi-
cation as a dictionary and now contend that the interpreter should first read
the specification to determine the patentee’s “actual invention” and then tai-
135. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365-66; Retractable, 659 F.3d at 1371 (Moore, J. dissenting
from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
136. E.g., Tex. Digital, 308 F.3d at 1203-04.
137. E.g., Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367.
138. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 144; see also Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 17, at 1142 (explaining that “in the long run” this approach will yield “more pre-
dictable” results“).
139. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960); see also
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 143 (citing Coase to support reliance on a term’s
general meaning in field).
140. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 79; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyou Kabuskiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002).
141. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpre-
tive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1041-42 (2007).
142. E.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1583; Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1144-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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lor the claim construction as necessary to capture this “actual invention,”
even if the court must disregard the claim language.145
Limiting claim construction to the specific context of the patent is justi-
fied as insuring that the patentee’s exclusive rights are proportional to what
the patentee actually invented and contributed to the field.146  Proportional-
ity, like predictability, is reasonably grounded in the classic economic justi-
fications of the patent system, as it ensures that the patentee incurred fixed
research and development costs for a product that justify monopoly rents,
and it mitigates social costs by leaving room for others to design around the
patent and make improvements.147
Phillips sought a middle ground between general and specific meaning
by embracing a skilled person’s perspective but concluding that the skilled
person would interpret the claims terms in the context of the entire patent,
not just using her background knowledge and understanding.148 Phillips fa-
vored a vague standard for determining when the context of the patent was
sufficient to overcome the general meaning to a skilled person, concluding
that this normally would become clear “upon reading the specification” and
was best resolved on a patent-by-patent basis.149 The increasing tendency of
the competing lines of authority to embrace either exclusively general or
exclusively specific meaning reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the
case-by-case adjudication endorsed by Phillips.
B. The Importance of General or Specific Meaning
If patents always used terminology consistent with its general meaning
in the field of the invention, the precedential split over general or specific
meaning would be of minimal significance. However, “the nature of lan-
guage makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent appli-
145. E.g., Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Retractable Techs.,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting
from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (criticizing this approach); see also, e.g.,
Interdigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Newman, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011); id. at 1311 (Plager, J., concurring); Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at
1797; Cotropia, supra note 122  at 1907; Liivak, supra note 28, at 44.
146. Retractable, 653 F.3d at 1311 (Plager, J., concurring); see Liivak, supra note 28, at
37-44.
147. The classic utilitarian justification for the patent system is that inventions are expen-
sive to produce but cheap to copy and without exclusive rights, and the accompanying monop-
oly rents, the patentee would not be able to recoup its fixed costs because competition would
drive prices to marginal cost. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003); Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580, 1597 (2003).
148. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
149. Id. at 1323-24.
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cation”150 and “the patent by its nature describes something novel.”151  Often
“words do not exist to describe” the novel invention or the “conversion of
machine to words allows for idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled”
with existing terminology.152 Patentees have to use new words,153 existing
words in new or unusual ways,154 existing words in new or unusual combina-
tions,155 specific words in more general ways,156 or general words in more
specific ways.157 Moreover, claims are drafted by patent prosecutors who
may not be versed in the terminology in the field or may inadvertently use
words incorrectly or otherwise differently from people in the field of inven-
tion.158 Finally, patent prosecutors often use patentese that resembles techni-
cal terminology but has acquired a specific and established meaning in the
patent prosecution context.159 For these reasons, the choice between the gen-
eral meaning a term normally bears in the technical field and the specific
meaning with which it is used in the patent will often result in different
claim constructions and therefore claim scope.
Empirical studies confirm the significance of the methodological split.
The Federal Circuit’s construction depends on the judges’ preferred method-
ological approaches and, consequently, the Federal Circuit’s claim construc-
150. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyou Kabuskiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
151. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322.
152. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also
Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1752; Amanda C. Schierz, Monitoring Knowledge: A text-
based approach, 13 TERMINOLOGY 125, 125 (2007) (“Key developments in science and engi-
neering are usually signalled by the introduction of new terms, and the exclusion of established
ones. . . .”).
153. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 888-89 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397; see also, Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d
1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “surrender value protected investment credits” was
not a term known in the field). But see Schierz, supra note 152, at 147.
154. See, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322; see also, e.g., ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK Steel Corp.,
700 F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the ordinary meaning in industry was
“clear,” that term “hot-rolled steel sheet” “refers to steel sheet that has not been cold-rolled,”
but patent used the term to refer to steel sheet that had been hot-rolled during production even
if it had also been cold-rolled).
155. E.g., Osenga, supra note 15, at 67 (giving example of “perimeter surface”).
156. E.g., Rajah Auto Supply Co. v. Belvidere Screw & Mach. Co., 275 F. 761, 763-64
(7th Cir. 1921) (holding that term “soft-metal” was normally used to refer to a specific, de-
fined group of metals, but patentee implicitly used term more generally in the patent to refer to
“a material which would upset, or was adaptable to be upset, when under pressure such as is
applied to a spark plug”).
157. E.g., Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300, 1308-11
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that broad claim term “remote interface” generally could include con-
sumer-owned personal computer but that patent used term more narrowly in way that excluded
consumer-owned personal computer).
158. E.g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he patentees used the term ‘heading of the aircraft’ to refer to what
would normally be referred to as the aircraft’s ‘bearing[.]’”); see Menell et al., supra note 65,
at 719-20.
159. See Menell et al., supra note 65, at 720.
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tion is related in a statistically significant way to the composition of the
panel of judges that hears an appeal.160 Likewise, “disputes over claim con-
struction outcomes found in the jurisprudence are overwhelming the result
of disagreements over the methodological approach,” with up to 95% of dis-
putes among Federal Circuit judges and 75-82% of Federal Circuit reversals
of district court claim constructions resulting from different choices between
the two competing methodologies.161 Thus, the Federal Circuit’s method-
ological split is directly responsible for most of the problems commentators
identify in the Federal Circuit’s claim construction precedent—high reversal
rates, unpredictability before litigation, uncertainty in litigation, appellate
panel dependence, disincentives to settle, and increased litigation and
costs.162
C. The Missing Question of Generalist Judges
The claim construction debate largely overlooks the abilities and limita-
tions of those who must implement claim construction: primarily generalist
judges.163 Although this type of “institutional blindness” pervades interpre-
tive theory generally,164 judges in other contexts have some measure of in-
herent competence to interpret legal documents that normally use ordinary
English or common legal terminology.165 By contrast, claim construction re-
quires generalist judges—the non-specialized and normally non-technically
trained district court judges and the specialized but generally non-technically
160. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 17, at 1163-70.
161. Id. at 1143-44.
162. These problems often are incorrectly attributed to the Federal Circuit’s de novo
standard of review for claim construction. See Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the
En Banc Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 43 (2013), available at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.
edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Reilly_Online_Final.pdf.
163. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patentee Claims 25-27, 41-43 (2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130961 (criti-
cizing other approaches on institutional grounds but failing to consider institutional capacities
for his own proposal to give “claim text primary weight”); Mullally, supra note 87, at 368
(criticizing “formalism” in claim construction in part as giving too much discretion to judges).
But see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 144-145.
164. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 9, 15-16.
165. The claim is that patents are more likely to present unfamiliar terminology to gener-
alist judges.  Of course, statutes and contracts sometimes use technical terminology with spe-
cialized meanings in specific fields. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (statutory interpretation accounting for specialized termi-
nology by providing for deference to the interpretation of an administrative agency charged
with implementing a specialized statute); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract & Innovation: The
Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 170, 214-15 (2013) (suggesting similar deference to contractual interpretations developed
by trade associations and other “contextualizing regimes”).  By contrast, the Federal Circuit
has declined to defer to Patent Office claim constructions. See SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g,
Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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trained Federal Circuit judges166—to interpret a mix of technical terminol-
ogy, patentese, and ordinary English.  The capacities and limitations of these
judges are thus particularly salient for claim construction.167
1. Interpretive Choice and Judicial Capacities
In the analogous context of constitutional and statutory interpretation,
Adrian Vermeule has provided the most sustained consideration of the rela-
tionship between judicial capacities and interpretive approaches, giving the
issue book-length treatment.168 Vermeule’s detailed analysis of judicial ca-
pacities and interpretation thus is a useful place to start in considering how
to craft a patent claim interpretation approach best suited to the capacities of
generalist judges.
Vermeule suggests that idealized theories about what interpretive ap-
proach will best promote certain interpretive values (e.g., predictability or
proportionality in claim construction) are necessarily incomplete without
considering whether the relevant institution (e.g., generalist judges) can suc-
cessfully implement the interpretive approach at a reasonable cost.169
Vermeule calls this evaluation of the fit between interpretive approach and
judicial capacities “interpretive choice.” According to Vermeule, interpretive
choice must first consider of the relative rate of error and the relative costs
of errors of the competing approaches.170 These errors could result from a
well-motivated judge who lacks information, has limited ability to process
information, or is vulnerable to cognitive biases, as well as from an ill-moti-
vated judge who is not sufficiently constrained to prevent intentional er-
rors.171 A difficulty with Vermeule’s approach is that an “error” can only be
defined in relation to some concept of a “correct” interpretation and compet-
ing interpretive approaches often differ on what constitutes a “correct”
interpretation.
Vermeule’s concern about disagreement over what constitutes a “cor-
rect” interpretation is borne out in patent claim construction. The various
sides in the claim construction debate disagree as to whether a “correct”
166. Claim construction is conducted in the first instance by district judges, with wide
ranging past experiences and dockets.  Although the Federal Circuit is a specialized court, its
docket also ranges far wider than patent cases, and only four of its fifteen current judges have
any technical background. See Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
Even judges with technical backgrounds often will be confronted with patent cases in an unfa-
miliar technical field, making their technical background largely irrelevant.
167. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim Con-
struction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 260 (2008) (noting problems
created by fact that a judge cannot just use his or her own judgment to interpret claim language
but rather must understand complex technology).
168. VERMEULE, supra note 29.
169. Id. at 16, 74, 77-78, 80-81.
170. Id. at 74, 77-78.
171. Id. at 78.
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interpretation is the general meaning to a skilled person in the field, the
specific meaning derived from the patent itself, or some combination of the
two. For constitutional and statutory interpretation, Vermeule overcomes
this difficulty by defining each approach’s errors in reference to its own
vision of a “correct” interpretation, and he explores whether each approach
can succeed even on its own terms. Using a similar approach for claim con-
struction can provide at least some traction on how well generalist judges
can implement the competing approaches.172
Aside from error rates and error costs, Vermeule notes that interpretive
choice also must account for the effect of a judge’s errors on other actors
and whether those actors will take steps to correct or avoid the mistakes or
will instead exploit them, as well as the relative costs of decisions for courts,
litigants, and those seeking legal advice regarding compliance ex ante.173
Additional sources of information or steps in the methodological process
may be too costly to justify any marginal impact they have on the quality of
the resulting decision.174
The problem for interpretive choice, according to Vermeule, is that
many of the relevant questions for constitutional and statutory interpretation
are intractable empirical questions. At best, judges have limited information
with which to answer these questions and—also, at best—limited cognitive
abilities to process the information that is available.175 Likewise, commenta-
tors in the patent context have been unable to prove whether or not the pat-
ent system promotes net social welfare or even whether consistently narrow
or consistently broad patent scope is preferable.176 In light of these difficul-
ties, determining the economically optimal scope for any particular patent
claim is a non-starter.177 A variety of other difficult empirical questions lurk
around claim construction, including whether predictability or proportional-
ity of claim scope best promotes the economic justification for patents, how
often patents use scientific terms consistent with their general meaning in the
field, and whether reliance on the general meaning in the field or the disclo-
sure of the patent makes claim scope more predictable.
Vermeule ultimately concludes that the limits of information and deci-
sion makers warrant a formalistic approach to statutory and constitutional
interpretation where judges “sharply limit their interpretive ambitions, in
part by limiting themselves to a small set of interpretive sources and a re-
stricted range of relatively wooden decision-rules.”178 He thus concludes that
172. See id. at 80-81.
173. Id. at 74, 78-79; see also id. at 167.
174. See id. at 156.
175. See id. at 3-4.
176. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 147, at 310, 324-25.
177. Chiang, supra note 163, at 25.
178. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 4.
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“judges should stick close to the surface-level or literal meaning.”179 Parts III
and IV infra similarly conclude that a limited and formalistic approach to
patent claim construction is best suited to the abilities of generalist judges.
However, these sections explain that, in the specific context of claim con-
struction, this approach would lead to an interpretation dependent on the
context provided by the patent specification and prosecution history, rather
than the “ordinary” or “plain” meaning that Vermeule appears to endorse for
constitutional and statutory interpretation.180
2. Institutional Choice or Interpretive Choice?
If an interpretive approach is not well suited to the interpreter, the
choice is to either change the interpretive approach or change the interpreter.
The second alternative, which can be called “institutional choice,” has re-
ceived significant attention in the claim construction scholarship.181 Al-
though a full analysis of alternative institutional arrangements is beyond the
scope of this Article, a brief summary shows significant shortcomings with
institutional alternatives to claim construction by generalist judges.
One category of claim construction proposals focuses on changing the
interpreter (i.e., institutional choice) by altering specialization at different
court levels. Proposals in this category would increase patent law specializa-
tion in the district court (to increase familiarity with the unique aspects of
claim construction) and/or decrease specialization in the appellate courts (to
decrease tunnel vision or increase variety in interpretive approaches).182
However, existing empirical evidence demonstrates that experience with
claim construction does not improve a district judge’s performance.183 At
best, increased specialization increases understanding of the legal rules and
customs of patent drafting and claim construction, and perhaps of patentese,
but it does not address the difficulties that arise from a non-technical judge
interpreting the technical content of patents. Decreased specialization
couples this same problem of non-technical judges with the additional prob-
lem of unfamiliarity with patent practice and patentese.
A second category of institutional proposals focuses on increasing the
technical competence of decision makers, whether by creating patent courts
with technically-trained judges or using technically-trained magistrates, spe-
cial masters, or court-appointed experts.184 Such proposals, if successfully
implemented, could change the calculus for interpretive choice. But
problems abound with these proposals. A person with a technical back-
179. See id.
180. See id. at 8 (noting that different variables and approaches may be appropriate for
different interpretive contexts).
181. Schwartz, supra note 167, at 260-63 (summarizing scholarship).
182. Id. at 261-66 (summarizing scholarship).
183. Id. at 225-26.
184. Id. at 261.
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ground (e.g., in biology) will be only marginally more capable of under-
standing technical content from another field (e.g., semiconductors) than a
non-technically trained judge. Thus, any proposal for permanent technically-
trained judges or magistrates is a non-starter, as it would require too great a
range of judges with different technical backgrounds (as well as sufficient
legal training, experience, and capabilities). Appointing special masters or
experts on a case-by-case basis is more promising, though it raises chal-
lenges in identifying the precise field of the invention and finding a qualified
master or expert in that field.  There also is a risk of biases and inaccuracies
if a master or expert is not from the precise field of the patent or had greater
or lesser skill and knowledge than normal in the field at the time of the
invention.185 More importantly, unless the judge completely abdicates claim
construction to the master or expert, she would still need to reach her own
conclusion on claim construction, raising most of the same interpretive
choice issues. Masters and court-appointed experts also often increase costs,
as the parties have to present the issues to them in the first instance and then
take objections or appeals to the district judge.
A final category of proposals would increase the role of the Patent Of-
fice in claim construction, even after the patent has issued.186 Although this
would increase competence with both technical content and patent terminol-
ogy, it raises an entire body of literature about the performance, competence,
and knowledge of patent examiners and the Patent Office.187  The result may
be to simply substitute one imperfect decision maker for another.
Ultimately, it is important to consider both institutional design and inter-
pretive choice as ways to improve claim construction. Since new institu-
tional arrangements for claim construction have failed to gain momentum,
generalist judges are likely to continue interpreting patent claims for the time
being. Tailoring a claim construction approach to their capabilities and limi-
tations thus offers a way to improve claim construction in the near term.
III. GENERALIST JUDGES AND GENERAL MEANING
In defending a claim construction approach focused on the general
meaning the claim term ordinarily bears in the field of the invention, Profes-
sors Wagner and Petherbridge contend that this allows “the knowledge of
technologists” to determine claim meaning.188 Overlooked, however, is
whether generalist judges can reliably determine “the knowledge of technol-
185. See infra Part III.A.1.
186. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation:
Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109 (2000).
187. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577 (1999) (summarizing complaints and proposals about Patent Office).
188. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 145.
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ogists” at a reasonable cost.189 This Part considers the ability of generalist
judges to accurately and cheaply identify the general meaning of a claim
term to a skilled person in the field of technology at the time of the inven-
tion. Part III.A focuses on the more extreme approach, increasingly popular
in the case law, which treats the general meaning of a claim term as control-
ling, with very narrow and exacting exceptions. Part III.B addresses the
more moderate position, endorsed in Phillips, which would require the
skilled person’s general understanding and knowledge to be supplemented
with the intrinsic evidence from the patent and prosecution history.
A. Generalist Judges and “Plain” Meaning
If, as proponents assume, determining the general or “plain” meaning of
a claim term was a straightforward matter of identifying “the commonly-
understood meaning” in the technical field at the time of the invention,190
there would be little concern about the capacities of generalist judges. Claim
construction under such an approach would require a finding of a historical
fact—i.e., the established meaning in the field at the time of the invention—
and generalist judges are well suited to find historical facts. However, deter-
mining the general meaning of a claim term to a skilled person in the field at
the time of the invention requires a series of difficult decisions, and judg-
ment calls that introduce a serious risk of error and makes identifying the
general meaning of a claim term anything but a simple finding of historical
fact.
1. The Difficulties of Determining General Meaning
A generalist judge attempting to identify the general meaning of a claim
term in the technical field faces threshold problems in defining the inquiry
and execution problems in carrying out the search for general meaning.
a. Threshold Problems
As a comprehensive approach to claim construction, the general or
“plain” meaning perspective faces a significant threshold obstacle: some
claim terms do not have a general meaning in the technical field at the time
of the invention. Patentees sometimes create new words or new combina-
tions of words to describe the new technology that the patent embodies.191
189. Id.
190. See id. at 28; see also Osenga, supra note 15, at 102-03 (recognizing that “it is
difficult for the non-scientific district court judge, with limited experience in patent cases, to
put himself into the shoes of an ordinary scientist,” but assuming understanding of PHOSITA
can and should be basis for claim construction).
191. See supra Part II.B.  Some have questioned the frequency of this. See Burk & Lem-
ley, supra note 20, at 1752; see also Schierz, supra note 152, at 147 (concluding that in the
artificial intelligence field “term usage increases in the academic community before becoming
the subject of patent documents”).
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Similarly, patent prosecutors have created specialized terminology, or
“patentese,” that “mak[es] it excessively hard for the technical expert to
comprehend the invention’s technical aspects through the patent.”192 General
meaning would be of little use to a judge construing these types of claim
terms.
A second threshold problem is that the judge must choose which words
in the claim to treat as a single interpretive unit—i.e., whether to look for the
general meaning in the technical field of a single word (perhaps “format” in
the St. Clair example), a short phrase (“file formats”), or a longer phrase (“a
plurality of computer image file formats”).193 In other interpretive contexts,
the judge’s familiarity with ordinary English usage will normally suffice to
choose the proper interpretive unit, but the judge lacks background familiar-
ity with technical terminology and patentese to reliably do so while constru-
ing claims. The general meaning approach does not permit the judge to
consult the patent specification until after the “ordinary” or “plain” meaning
is established. The judge is left to guess what words constitute a single
phrase that will have a general meaning in the field, and the parties are likely
to propose different combinations of words that better suit their respective
interests. The likely result is that the judge will interpret claims in piecemeal
fashion, since the extrinsic texts used to identify general meaning are more
likely to define individual words or small phrases than longer or more com-
plex phrases.194 Because a full phrase can carry a very different meaning
than the meaning derived from patching together definitions of individual
words, the resulting claim construction will depart from the general meaning
in the field whenever a skilled person would interpret a larger phrase
together.195
Finally, the judge must determine whether an inquiry into the special-
ized meaning in the field is even required, or whether someone in the techni-
cal field would understand the claim term in the same way that a lay
person—like the judge—would understand the term.196 Due to self-interest
and cognitive limitations, judges are likely to underestimate how often a
term bears a specialized meaning in the technical field.197 If a term does not
have a specialized meaning, the judge can apply his or her own understand-
ing, reducing the judges’ decision costs and increasing his or her time for
other cases and leisure.  Additionally, judges, like anyone, seek to confirm
192. Fromer, supra note 37, at 567-68.
193. Burk & Lemley, supra note 16, at 41-46.
194. Id. at 46.
195. Id. at 41-46.
196. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
197. See Menell et al., supra note 65, at 733-34 (“Some plain English terms can have
technical meanings in particular fields.”).
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their original hypotheses and beliefs (“confirmation bias”)198 and be more
confident that they have the right answer than they should be (“overconfi-
dence bias”).199 And to the extent that the judge’s own understanding reflects
current knowledge or technology in the field, whether from learning about it
in the case or from general knowledge, “hindsight bias” will cause the judge
to project the current knowledge and developments in the field into the
meaning at the time of the invention.200  Recent opinions applying a general
meaning approach support the intuition that judges tend to overestimate how
often the general meaning in the field is the same as the judge’s own back-
ground understanding of a term. In these opinions, the judge simply states
the “ordinary meaning,” presumably based on the judge’s own understand-
ing, without identifying any source corroborating this as the understanding
of a skilled person at the time of the invention,201 even though Phillips sug-
gested this would be inappropriate “[i]n many cases that give rise to
litigation.”202
b. Execution Problems
Aside from the threshold problems, a generalist judge trying to identify
the general meaning of a claim term in the technical field must undertake
two legal fictions: construing claims retrospectively at the time of patent
filing and stepping into the shoes of a skilled person in the technical field.203
The counterfactual nature of these inquiries introduces additional sources of
error.204
Originalist approaches to statutory and constitutional interpretation that
look to meaning at the time of enactment similarly rely on counterfactual
assumptions about the time of interpretation. In those areas, the relevant
texts are often decades or even centuries old, whereas the gap between filing
and interpretation in patent cases often will be a matter of only a few years
198. See Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristi and
Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 99 (2005).
199. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature
Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1288 n.78 (1999).
200. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1402 (2006).
201. See, e.g., In re Rambus, Inc., 694 F.3d 42 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (2012);
Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent’mt Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Retractable
Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011); St. Clair Intell. Prop.
Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc., 412 F. App’x. 270 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Arlington Indus., Inc. v.
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated
Dep’t Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc.,
317 Fed. Appx. 982 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
202. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
203. Schwartz, supra note 167 at 260.
204. See Osenga, supra note 15, at 102-03.
274 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:243
and generally no more than twenty-six years.205 However, language used to
describe new technology is likely to be more fluid than the language used in
other interpretive contexts, which increases both the difficulty of identifying
a source close enough to the time of filing to be reliable and the likelihood of
error if the judge relies on a source from a slightly different time.206
The counterfactual need to step into the shoes of a skilled person in the
technical field is a problem generally unique to patent claim construction.
Identifying the exact field of the invention is fraught with difficulty and
levels of abstraction problems, as inventions can open entirely new fields or,
more commonly, cross between fields or expand existing fields.207 The level
of skill in the field is easier to articulate—it is generally treated as median or
common skill—but it is as hard or harder to determine, requiring considera-
tion of the typical education in the field, complexity of the technology, ra-
pidity of change in the field, and existing approaches in the field.208
Thus, to reliably identify the general meaning of a claim term in the
technical field at the time of invention, the judge must find a source that
accurately reflects the correct skill level, the precise field, and the exact time
of the invention. The odds of finding a specialized source in the exact field
at the precise time of the invention are low. More likely, a judge will con-
front multiple potential sources, each imperfect in skill, field, and/or time,
with the litigants incentivized to engage in a costly arms races to identify the
most helpful sources and definitions for their position, regardless of how
obscure or actually reflective of a skilled person’s understanding.209 This risk
of “dictionary shopping” is familiar in other interpretive areas,210 but is prob-
ably more acute in patent law because of the increased breadth, discretion,
and range of sources that result from the additional variables of identifying
the technical field and skill level.211
Even if a judge could find a reliable source for a term’s meaning in the
field at the time of the invention, there is no reason to think that this is the
“general” meaning. As Professors Burk and Lemley have noted, a skilled
person would understand a term to “have a range of meanings, from narrow
205. Patentees are entitled to a right to exclude for twenty years from filing of the patent
application and must sue for infringement damages within six years of the infringement. 35
U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 286 (2012).
206. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 535.
207. Burk and Lemley give the example of a patent related to DNA, which could be seen
as arising in the field of biochemistry, cell biology, molecular biology, or, at a higher level of
generality, biology.  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1189 (2002).
208. Id.
209. With rates approaching $400/hour for even junior associates at the firms regularly
handling complex patent cases, these search costs can be substantial.
210. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 28
(2009).
211. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 535.
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to broad,” so that, for example, a biotechnologist would understand the term
“monoclonal antibody” but also would understand that it could be limited to
“IgM mouse-derived antibodies” or extend to “any antibody, including chi-
meric and humanized antibodies” depending on the context in which it is
used.212 More recent cases applying a general meaning approach instruct
courts to simply choose the broadest of possible meanings a term could bear
in the field.213 However, a term that is normally used narrowly may occa-
sionally be used more broadly, and there is no reason to presume that the
broadest meaning that can be derived from the wide range of possible
sources, definitions, and levels of abstraction accurately reflects a skilled
person’s general understanding of the term at the time of the invention, the
purported goal of this approach.
Older general meaning cases did permit resort to the context of the spec-
ification and prosecution history if the judge first determined from extrinsic
sources that multiple possible meanings “would have been attributed to the
words of the claims by those skilled in the art.”214 A judge following these
instructions is likely to systematically underestimate how often a term could
bear multiple meanings to a skilled person, as the judge incurs lower deci-
sion costs from identifying a single meaning from extrinsic sources, rather
than identifying multiple meanings in the extrinsic sources and then having
to parse through the intrinsic record to choose between them. Similarly,
hindsight and confirmation biases suggest that the judge will tend to con-
clude that the only possible meaning is the one closest to her own under-
standing of the term or knowledge of the present state of technology.
Finally, an outcome- or policy-motivated judge215 can simply select the best
meaning for his or her preferred outcome and conclude that no ambiguity
exists that would justify consulting the intrinsic record.216
Expert testimony offers little help in solving the difficulties for a gener-
alist judge in identifying the general meaning of a claim term in the technical
field at the time of invention. Not only does the use of expert testimony
increase litigation costs,217 but the same difficulties exist in determining
whether the expert had the precise (or close enough) skill in the precise (or
212. Burk & Lemley, supra note 16, at 40.
213. E.g., Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
214. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
215. Patent law may not be an area in which most district judges have strong pro-patent
or anti-patent policy preferences, though some federal districts, such as the Eastern District of
Texas, are regarded as having a pro-patentee bias, in order to attract litigation that boosts local
economies. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2006, at A1.  Federal Circuit judges are likely to have strong policy views about
patent law and the appropriate scope of protection.
216. See Mullally, supra note 87, at 368.
217. Technical experts in patent cases generally charge at least $350/hour, and each hour
spent by the expert is likely to be matched by the attorney managing the expert.
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close enough) field at the precise (or close enough) time of the invention. An
expert who had greater or lesser skill at the time of invention, was in a
related field, or was skilled before or after the relevant time, may substi-
tute—intentionally or inadvertently—his or her own understanding for that
of a skilled person in the field at the time of the invention. Expert testimony
also introduces errors from hindsight bias and the fact that it “is generated at
the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias
that is not present in intrinsic evidence.”218
Nor is a generalist judge well suited to guard against or correct these
problems with expert claim construction testimony. The judge lacks the ex-
pertise or background knowledge and experience to evaluate the accuracy or
reasonableness of the expert’s purported general meaning in the field and
cannot use the context of the specification or prosecution history to evaluate
what constitutes the “general” meaning in the field. The judge can only eval-
uate the expert’s performance as a witness, which favors professional ex-
perts over those actually working in the field and accentuates the litigation
bias of expert testimony.
2. Consequences of Errors
A core assumption of the general meaning approach is that this meaning
is readily identifiable and will enhance public notice and predictability in
patent law.219 Indeed, to proponents, the notice and predictability it offers is
sufficient to tolerate the acknowledged significant risk that this approach
will result in claim scope broader than warranted by the patentee’s contribu-
tion to the field.220
However, as demonstrated in the prior section, the ease of identifying
the general meaning to a skilled person in the field is superficial, at best.
The difficulty, variability, and unconstrained discretion introduced at each of
the various stages in this inquiry create a significant possibility that a com-
petitor predicting ex ante what the claim covers will reach a different out-
come than the construction ultimately adopted by a generalist judge in
litigation.221 Patentees have incentives to exacerbate the difficulties a gener-
alist judge has identifying the general meaning of a claim term by choosing
broad, vague, and ambiguous language that increases the range of possible
218. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
219. See supra Part II.A.
220. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 145; see Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Bec-
ton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371-72 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for rehearing en banc).
221. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1752. These stages include: choosing the
interpretive unit, choosing whether to apply the judge’s own understanding or to look for a
specialized meaning, identifying the field and skill level of the invention, finding a source at
the skill level in the field at the time of the invention, and choosing between multiple imperfect
sources and multiple meanings or levels of abstraction. See supra Part III.A.1.
Spring 2014] Judicial Capacities & Claim Construction 277
sources and meanings and maximizes the patentee’s flexibility and the po-
tential reach in subsequent litigation.222
This unpredictability is particularly problematic because it is closer to
true uncertainty (“unknown unknowns”), not just risk (“known
unknowns”).223 Even a competitor well versed in the meaning to a skilled
person at the time of the invention will have difficulty anticipating (1) how
an unknown judge with an unknown background will understand the term
years later; (2) the wide range of possible meanings that can be derived from
tangentially relevant sources; or (3) meanings that do exist at the time of its
decision and are only derived years later from hindsight bias based on subse-
quent technological developments or the litigation driven assertions of a paid
expert. Thus, the unpredictability of a general meaning approach to claim
construction is difficult to plan around, such as by factoring into the cost-
benefit analysis in deciding whether to launch a product.224
B. Generalist Judges and the Phillips Approach
Perhaps the line of cases that increasingly emphasizes just the general
meaning of a claim term in the technical field goes too far in limiting reli-
ance on the patent specification. Maybe generalist judges could overcome
the difficulties of identifying the general meaning of claim terms in the field
of the invention by supplementing the skilled person’s general knowledge
and understanding with the additional information provided in the intrinsic
record. The resulting interpretation then would be consistent with both the
general meaning in the field and the context of the specification. This ap-
proach could eliminate or mitigate some of the problems described above,
such as the lack of an existing meaning in the field, the choice of interpretive
unit, the choice between multiple meanings from several imperfect sources,
and the evaluation of expert testimony.
However, this is the basic approach that the Federal Circuit has en-
dorsed for the past twenty years, including in Phillips—claim terms must
reflect a skilled person’s understanding but also must be consistent with the
222. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 56-57. If the broad claim is rejected in
prosecution, the patentee can cheaply narrow the claim slightly by amendment until it obtains
the broadest possible language the examiner will allow.  In litigation, the patentee will benefit
from the presumption of validity.  Nor does a general meaning approach offer any counter-
vailing incentive for the patentee to say more about the invention, as some have suggested. See
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 144. This is because “patentees rationally have little
to no incentive to offer more information than the patent laws require and have an incentive to
obfuscate information they provide whenever possible” so as to limit competitors’ efforts to
design-around the patent, develop improvements, or practice the invention after patent expira-
tion. See Fromer, supra note 37, at 552-53.
223. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
969 (1984).
224. See id.
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specification.225 The result has been what Professors Wagner and Pether-
bridge call a “standardless, ad-hoc determination of claim meaning”226 that
has received virtually unanimous criticism from commentators.227 These
problems derive from two sources.
First, to construe claims from the skilled person’s perspective, the court
must determine the skilled person’s background knowledge and understand-
ing before it determines how the context of the patent and prosecution his-
tory affects this background understanding. This approach introduces many
of the same difficulties, opportunities for error, and costs described in the
prior section. Given these difficulties, it is unsurprising that district court and
Federal Circuit judges rarely address the skilled person’s background knowl-
edge and understanding or cite to extrinsic texts or expert testimony to un-
derstand how a term is generally used in the field.228 Although doing so may
reduce decision costs, it increases error costs for an approach meant to cap-
ture a skilled person’s understanding of the claim term.
The second problem is that the judge must decide when the context of
the intrinsic record can limit or change the general meaning in the field.  The
cases and scholarship normally frame this question as whether a particular
construction properly reads the claim term in the context of the specification
or improperly imports a limitation from the specification into the claim.229
The line between these two canons is notoriously difficult to draw,230 and
patentees have the incentive to blur this line to retain flexibility.231 The Fed-
eral Circuit has sought to guide this inquiry with various canons: references
to “the invention” or “the present invention” are defining but references to
“an embodiment” or “the preferred embodiment” are merely exemplary,
statements that distinguish the prior art are normally defining, statements in
certain sections of the patent are more likely to be defining, and consistent
and uniform usage may be defining.232 These canons have had marginal im-
pact, as they do little to target a skilled person’s perspective (the purported
goal of the Phillips approach),233 are normally discretionary not
225. See supra Part II.A; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc).
226. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 144.
227. See, e.g., Osenga, supra note 15, at 68-73.
228. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 55 (Federal Circuit); Osenga, supra note
15, at 103 (district courts).
229. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Cotropia,
supra note 122, at 1866-67.
230. Cotropia, supra note 115, at 1867.
231. Menell et al., supra note 65, at 747-48.
232. See id. at 750-52; CHISUM, supra note 90, § 18.03[2][c][ix] & nn.666-670.
233. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 67-68, 72.
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mandatory,234 have been inconsistently applied,235 and are easily avoided by
competent patent drafters.
The basic problem with an approach that seeks to reconcile general
meaning in the field and specific meaning from the context of the patent is
that it is virtually impossible for generalist judges to know whether a skilled
person would deem a statement in the specification as sufficiently clear and
definitional to limit or alter the general understanding that the skilled person
had before encountering the patent.236 The suggestion in Phillips that this
question would be clear on a case-by-case basis has not been borne out.
IV. GENERALIST JUDGES, SPECIFIC MEANING, AND AN ORDINARY READER
STANDARD
Given the problems with identifying the general meaning of a claim
term in the technical field at the time of the invention, it is not surprising that
one line of Federal Circuit cases has moved towards relying only on the
specific meaning of a claim term in the context of the patent, without regard
to how it is normally used in the technical field. Focusing just on the context
of the patent eliminates or reduces many of the problems that the general
meaning approach poses for generalist judges. For example, a judge can de-
termine what words or phrases in the claim to interpret together by looking
at what words or phrases are used together in the intrinsic record.  Nor
would the judge encounter the cost and difficulty of finding a source at the
right skill level in the right field at the right time of the invention, or choos-
ing between several imperfect sources. The relevant source for interpretation
would be the publicly-available patent and prosecution history, written near
the time of the invention and, by definition, at the skill level and in the field
of the invention.
The movement towards exclusive reliance on the context of the patent is
promising from the perspective of tailoring claim construction to the abilities
and limitations of generalist judges. As set forth below, however, Part IV.A
contends that the approach adopted in these cases—construing claim terms
in whatever way is necessary to reflect the invention disclosed in the specifi-
cation—is no more feasible for generalist judges than the general meaning
approach. Part IV.B proposes an alternative way to limit claim construction
to the specific meaning in the context of the patent—giving claim terms the
meaning an ordinary reader would understand based on the use of the spe-
cific term in the specification and prosecution history—and contends that
this is better suited for generalist judges. Part IV.C suggests that an ordinary
234. See Menell et al., supra note 65, at 745-52.
235. See Golden, supra note 72, at 379.
236. Use of expert testimony leaves the judge no better off, since each side would present
an expert willing to take its preferred position.
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reader standard is not only suitable for generalist judges but also normatively
appealing.
A. Generalist Judges and the Focus on the Disclosed Invention
Scholars and judges emphasizing reliance on the patent specification
and prosecution history in claim construction have increasingly favored a
two-step approach. Under this approach, the judge would first determine
what a skilled person in the field would conclude the patentee actually in-
vented and disclosed in the specification, and, second, tailor the claim lan-
guage in whatever way is necessary to capture this invention, regardless of
the words actually chosen.237 Proponents of this “disclosed invention” ap-
proach believe that “[i]n almost all cases, the inventors, and their patent
solicitors, knew what was invented and generally disclosed their invention in
competent language.”238 Even assuming the first part is true, the second is
overly optimistic, considering the capacities of generalist judges. In practice,
the disclosed invention approach is likely to be as difficult, error prone, and
costly for generalist judges as the general meaning approach.
1. Problems with Disclosed Invention
There is an ahistorical tendency to the disclosed-invention approach. In
the first half of the 1800s, there was no requirement for claims, with judges
required to determine the patentee’s invention and the scope of its rights
directly from the “full explanation of the invention” in the specification, es-
sentially what proponents of the disclosed-invention approach suggest.239
Because the specification included a mixture of information about the prior
art, the invention itself, and parts or processes that operated in conjunction
with the invention, the judge had to “ascertain[ ] the exact invention of the
patentee by inference and conjecture, derived from a laborious examination
of previous inventions, and a comparison thereof with that claimed by
him.”240 Congress added the claim requirement exactly because of the
problems generalist judges had with this task, transferring the burden of de-
termining the patentee’s “actual invention” to the relative experts in the Pat-
ent Office.241 Proponents of the disclosed-invention approach offer no reason
to think that generalist judges are better equipped to execute this task for
today’s complex patents on semiconductors, software concepts, and biotech-
237. See supra Part II.A.
238. Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134,
135 (1938)
240. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877); see Merrill v.
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1877).
241. See Keystone Bridge, 95 U.S. at 278.
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nology than they were for the comparatively simple patents on basic ma-
chines and industrial processes.242
There is good reason to believe they are not. Defining the patentee’s
“actual invention” based on the disclosure in the specification is exceedingly
difficult. As Professor Chiang has recognized, defining the invention
presents a classic levels of abstraction problem.243 Professor Chiang offers
the simple, but illuminating, example of the Wright Brothers, who built and
disclosed “a single barely-flying wooden glider.”244 How should we describe
their “actual invention”: a flying machine? A flying machine with wings? A
flying machine with wings and rudders?  A wooden flying machine with
wings and rudders?245 Scholars have proposed alternative ways to resolve
this level of abstraction problem, variably describing the “actual invention”
as “a tangible and working embodiment”;246 “the set of disclosed embodi-
ments” in the specification and their shared “essential elements . . . that
enable them to produce the sought after result;”247 the inventor’s “real-space
activities and recognitions” memorialized within the patent;248 or an inherent
policy decision about social benefits, necessary incentives, social costs, and
importance.249
Scholars have the luxury of debating this interesting question, but judges
must make decisions in real-world cases.250 How are they supposed to tailor
claim language to the “actual invention” if scholars cannot even agree on
how to define the “actual invention”? Even if scholars did coalesce around
one solution to the levels of abstraction problem, terms like “essential ele-
ments,” “recognitions,” “importance,” “social benefits,” and “costs” raise
difficult scientific (and economic) questions not well suited for direct deter-
mination by generalist judges in the context of litigation.
The content of the specification complicates the task of identifying the
“actual invention.” The specification describes the invention at various
levels of generality, from its “nature and gist” to the best way the inventor
knows of implementing it, exacerbating the inherent levels of abstraction
problem.251 Further, these varying descriptions of the invention are mixed
with descriptions of the prior art, specific materials, experimental results,
industrial applications, and other such peripheral content. The patentee’s in-
242. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 20; Cotropia, supra note 122; Liivak, supra
note 28.
243. Chiang, supra note 36, at 1122-23.
244. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2012).
245. See id.
246. Chiang, supra note 36, at 1118.
247. Oskar Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 73-74 (2012).
248. Cotropia, supra note 122, at 1876-77.
249. See Chiang, supra note 36, at 1134-38.
250. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 2-4.
251. See supra Part I.A.1.
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centives are to be as vague and unclear as possible about what exact content
or level of generality reflects the invention, both to avoid limiting the scope
of its patent and to obfuscate useful information about the invention from
competitors.252  Separating the parts of the specification that describe the
invention and the parts that describe other information—i.e., prior art or
working examples— requires a detailed understanding of several technical
concepts, including: existing knowledge in the field, how the invention dif-
fers from the prior art, the common principles or operation underlying each
working example, and the substitutability of various features of the inven-
tion. This task is better suited for scientists than generalist judges.253 Indeed,
“disclosed invention” cases emphasize that the actual invention is deter-
mined from a skilled person’s perspective—i.e., what the skilled person
would understand to be the invention from reading the specification—intro-
ducing the same difficulties of identifying the precise field and skill level
and background knowledge and understanding of the skilled person.254
Forcing judges to undertake a direct inquiry into the “actual invention”
on a case-by-case basis is a recipe for error: it introduces significant risk of
hindsight bias or outcome bias (i.e., the invention will be defined in the way
that conforms best to the current state of technology or the judge’s preferred
result), offers little constraint on judicial discretion, and is prohibitively
expensive.
2. Consequences of Errors
The disclosed-invention approach is primarily justified as necessary to
ensure proportionality, i.e., that the patentee’s exclusive rights do not extend
beyond the contribution the patentee made to the field.255 If this approach is
compared to a general meaning approach, then a direct effort to construe
claims to capture the invention disclosed in the specification almost by defi-
nition offers greater proportionality.
However, the difficulties a generalist judge will face in implementing
the disclosed-invention approach severely undermine its promised propor-
tionality. Patent prosecutors purposefully include broad or ambiguous lan-
guage in the specification in an effort to maximize future patent scope.256 For
example, patentees often include broad statements about the importance or
252. See Fromer, supra note 37, at 567-68.
253. Relying on expert testimony would introduce the error and decision costs previously
discussed with regard to general meaning. See supra Part III.A.1.
254. See Liivak, supra note 28, at 44.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. See Fromer, supra note 37, at 567-68.  It is optimistic to suggest, as some propo-
nents have, that the disclosed-invention approach would “cause[ ] patent prosecutors to include
more information in the specification in hopes of expanding what constitutes the disclosed
invention.”  Cotropia, supra note 34, at 132.  Rather, they would have the incentive to include
as broad, vague, and ambiguous descriptions as they could to exploit the difficulty generalist
judges have in identifying the invention and thereby maximize future flexibility.  The de-em-
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achievement of the invention in the Summary of the Invention, statements
that seem to be puffery or aspirational when compared to the more limited
advance that the patentee describes in other portions of the patent. But, given
the problems a generalist judge will have in parsing through the detailed and
varied content of the specification, a judge may credit these statements as
reflecting the “actual invention.” This is especially true because these broad
statements often are introduced with language such as “This invention re-
lates to . . .”, whereas the more detailed descriptions in other parts of the
patent are normally characterized as describing “an embodiment” or “an ex-
ample.” Hindsight bias may reinforce the tendency to credit these broader
statements about the invention, as doing so is more likely to capture how the
field of technology subsequently developed and what it encompasses today.
The problems a generalist judge would have implementing the dis-
closed-invention approach can also create underbreadth. The largest part of
the patent describes specific examples—examples that often include very
particular features, materials, measurements—reflecting the patentee’s “best
mode” or actual commercial product. Since these descriptions are normally
more concrete than descriptions of the invention at higher levels of general-
ity, the judge erroneously may treat them as an essential part of the “actual
invention.”
Balanced against the uncertain proportionality benefits of a disclosed-
invention approach is the ex ante unpredictability created by its open-ended
nature. The exclusive focus on the disclosure of the publicly-available patent
document may actually enhance predictability as compared to the broad
search for any tangentially relevant extrinsic source permitted when claim
construction focuses on the general meaning of claim terms.257  However, a
wide range of possible constructions result from the need to identify the
right level of abstraction for the “invention,” identify the invention at this
level of abstraction from the content filled specification, and then determine
the appropriate language to capture this “invention.”  As a result, there is a
significant possibility that a generalist judge in litigation will reach a differ-
ent conclusion than a competitor would ex ante.
B. Generalist Judges and the Ordinary Reader Standard
To this point, this Article has criticized existing claim construction ap-
proaches for their high error and decision costs when applied by generalist
judges. Errors and decision costs are inevitable under any interpretive ap-
proach, however.258 This is especially true in claim construction, where there
phasis on the claim language also would give patentees little reason to spend money drafting
quality claims. See Chiang, supra note 163, at 40-41.
257. Interdigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Newman, J., dissenting).
258. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 109.
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is a measure of inherent indeterminacy in converting both the technical con-
tent of the patentee’s invention, and the intangible concepts of intellectual
property rights, into words.259 The criticisms of the various approaches are
largely irrelevant unless an alternative approach exists that is better suited
and less costly for generalist judges to apply.260 This Section proposes such
an approach: construing claim terms based on how an ordinary reader would
understand a term from its use in the patent and prosecution history.
1. Simplifying Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader Standard
The common problem with the various claim construction approaches is
that they ask generalist judges to be scientists, not lawyers.  Whether tasked
with determining the meaning a term normally bears to a skilled person in
the field, determining how a skilled person would reconcile the context of
the patent with her background knowledge and understanding, or deriving
what a skilled person would deem the patentee’s “actual invention” from the
varied disclosure of the specification, generalist judges are ill-suited to un-
dertake the counterfactual role of a technical person in the field of the
invention.261
Those who recognize the difficulties of asking a generalist judge to take
on the perspective of a skilled technical person generally favor increasing
the role of extrinsic texts and expert testimony to educate the judge about the
scientific principles and the background knowledge and understanding of a
skilled person.262 As an empirical matter, it is unclear whether greater access
to extrinsic texts and expert testimony will improve the ability of judges to
step into the shoes of a technical person. It may. Greater use of extrinsic
texts and expert testimony will not alleviate many of the problems a judge
will have doing so, however, when he or she must identify the exact field of
the invention and skill level in the field, reconcile extrinsic sources with the
intrinsic record, or determine what level of abstraction constitutes the “actual
invention.”263 Moreover, increased reliance on extrinsic sources increases in-
centives for strategic behavior by litigants, such as “dictionary-shopping”
259. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-97 (Ct. Cl.
1967); Schwartz, supra note 167, at 259-60.
260. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 109.
261. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 167, at 260.
262. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 67-68 (proposing greater use of technical
experts and experts on patent drafting in claim construction); Osenga, supra note 15, at 103
(“[D]istrict courts must be encouraged to make factual findings about who exactly this
PHOSITA is in any given case and what he  knows. . . .”); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note
14, at 144-45 (proposing an approach by which “the knowledge of technologists determines
the meaning” of claim terms).
263. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 72, 98-99 (2012) (noting that “a fully-fleshed PHOSITA” would not help resolve tension
between general and specific meaning inherent in Phillips approach).
Spring 2014] Judicial Capacities & Claim Construction 285
and litigation-driven expert testimony.264 Thus, a greater emphasis on extrin-
sic evidence may result in more biased information being presented to the
court, decreasing the court’s ability to accurately capture the skilled person’s
understanding.265
The speculative gains from increased reliance on extrinsic texts and ex-
pert testimony are accompanied by definite costs. Extrinsic evidence in-
creases the costs of claim construction, both for the litigants identifying and
preparing this evidence and for the judge from processing and evaluating
it.266 In interpretive situations of speculative gains and definite costs, judges
are wise to “restrict the range of information they attempt to collect and
reduce the complexity of their behavioral repertoire.”267
Rather than increase reliance on the skilled person’s perspective, claim
construction would be better off by eliminating it and replacing it with a
more straightforward ordinary reader standard that focuses on the substan-
tive and linguistic context provided by the publicly-available patent and
prosecution history itself, and not the background knowledge or understand-
ing of any particular person. A judge asked to interpret a claim term would
determine the meaning that term would bear to the ordinary reader based on
the contextual clues surrounding the use of that specific claim term in the
publicly-available patent and prosecution history. The judge would not have
to undertake the far more complicated, error-prone, and costly tasks of
searching the scientific literature to determine the general way in which that
a technical person would understand the term, or, like a peer reviewer for a
scientific journal, identifying what parts of the specification represent ex-
isting knowledge and what represent the patentee’s advancement.268 Rather,
the judge would engage in the more familiar task of determining how an
ordinary reader would understand a term based on the contextual clues that
surround its use in the patent document and accompanying prosecution his-
tory, which is more similar to what is required in other interpretive areas.269
264. See Mullally, supra note 87, at 368.
265. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 108 (explaining that additional information may
not increase accuracy of decision-making if it is “particularly distorting, inflammatory, or bur-
densome when considered by a decision maker with limited capacity to absorb and evaluate
the information”).
266. See Cotropia, supra note 35, at 88-90.
267. VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 5.
268. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 69-70 (1994) (“Generalists should be modest and simple.
While recognizing that specialists might produce a more nuanced approach, generalists must
see that the process and error costs are much higher when they try to do the same thing.”).
269. See e.g., 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:2 (7th ed. 2007) (explaining that a word is a symbol that directs the reader
to a referent and that interpretation is the effort to make the referent for a specific word in
dispute as clear as possible from the information and evidence presented).
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Scholars seem to assume that interpretation from a skilled person’s per-
spective is a necessity for claim construction.270 To be sure, the skilled per-
son’s perspective is a common feature of patent law—used, for example, to
evaluate whether a patent was a sufficient advance so as to be non-obvious
and to determine whether the specification adequately teaches how to make
and use the invention—and it is inevitable that generalist judges to some
extent must step into the shoes of scientists to resolve patent cases.271 In
other areas of patent law, the skilled person’s perspective is a statutory re-
quirement272: for claim construction, however, it is a judicially-created doc-
trine of recent vintage, attributable to the Federal Circuit, not Supreme Court
mandate.273 Aside from the statutory mandate, the skilled person’s perspec-
tive is inevitable in other doctrinal areas, as it is impossible to know whether
an invention is obvious in light of existing knowledge or whether a patent
adequately explains how to make and use the invention except in the context
of people operating in the technical field. But that does not mean that judges
need to step into the shoes of scientists for every issue in a patent case if
there is a viable alternative. With claim construction, the disclosure of the
specification, rather than the perspective of a skilled person, can provide the
court with sufficient context to interpret the term.274
The most thoughtful defenses of the skilled person’s perspective for
claim construction point to the basic linguistic notion that words have no
inherent meaning and only acquire meaning from the shared reaction to texts
of the relevant “community of readers [or listeners].”275  However, the work
of John Golden has driven a growing recognition that it is inaccurate to
assume that skilled people are the “community of readers” of patent
claims.276 As an initial matter, there is the well-recognized, though probably
270. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 105, 106 (2005); Osenga, supra note 15, at 101-04.
271. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 207, at 1185-87.
272. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (adopting “person having ordinary skill in the art” stan-
dard for obviousness); id. § 112(a) (specification must enable “any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains” to make and use it).
273. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 207, at 1187; Golden, supra note 72, at 348-68.
274. The unique context provided by the specification, which lacks parallel in other inter-
pretive areas, also explains the apparent disconnect of applying an ordinary reader standard to
patent claims when technical terms in statutes and contracts are normally construed from a
technical perspective in the field.  In those fields, there is no choice but to rely on a technical
perspective because there is no accompanying description from which an ordinary reader can
derive meaning for those technical terms. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 96, at 73; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b) (1981); id. § 202 cmt. f (1981) (noting that
technical terms should not be interpreted from technical perspective if context shows another
meaning was intended).
275. See Easterbrook, supra note 268, at 61; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533 n.2, 536 (1983); see also Osenga, supra note 15, at 101-02
(relying on linguistic theory to endorse PHOSITA standard for claim construction).
276. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 67-68; Golden, supra note 72; see also
Janis & Holbrook, supra note 263.
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overstated, belief that skilled people in technical fields do not read patents.277
Even if skilled people do read patents, however, it does not mean that they
read, focus on, or understand the claims. The specification provides a sub-
stantive technical disclosure, whereas claims define the legal boundaries. A
skilled person reading a patent is more likely to focus on the specification
and ignore the claims for two reasons.278 First, the specification bears at least
a remote similarity to a scientific journal article,279 while claims are unfamil-
iar entities unique to patent law. In instructing scientists how to read patents,
one publication advises them to “ignore the claims section at the end of the
patent.  These are lawyers talking to lawyers; rarely is there useful data
there.”280
Second, as Golden explains, “[d]ecisions that claim interpretation is
meant to inform—such as whether to pursue a particular course of research
and development, to launch a new product or service, to invest in another’s
efforts to do either of these, or to make one’s own separate business reliant
on a potentially infringing product or service—are business decisions typi-
cally made by people having little, if any, skill in the relevant technol-
ogy.”281 Thus, “because claims are written to define legal bounds rather than
to communicate technological understanding, business decision-makers,
lawyers, and patent examiners are more likely than ordinary artisans to be
the real parties in interest for questions about claim meaning,” as is also true
for generalist courts.282
On the other hand, Golden’s further suggestion that skilled people
should not even be considered a part of the audience for patent claims283
assumes a sophisticated company seeking to introduce a competing product
in which the business decision makers are distinct from the skilled people
and there is ready access to patent lawyers in choosing a course of con-
duct.284 In many other settings—smaller companies; larger companies with
limited in-house counsel; researchers at universities, hospitals, and other re-
search organizations with limited access to counsel; and individual inven-
tors—skilled people may have no choice but to read patent claims.285  A
277. See Lisa Larrimore Ouelette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 545, 557-61, 570 (2012) (summarizing arguments that innovators do not read
patents but finding that 64% of surveyed nanotechnology researchers had read patents).
278. See Golden, supra note 72, at 368-69.
279. See Ouelette, supra note 277, at 553-54.
280. Harry Robson, How to Read a Patent, in VERIFIED SYNTHESES OF ZEOLITIC MATERI-
ALS 79 (Harry Robson ed., 2d rev. ed. 2001).
281. Golden, supra note 72, at 370.
282. See id. at 369, 376.
283. See id. at 368-69, 383 (proposing “a patent attorney with access to the knowledge of
an ordinary artisan” perspective for claim construction).
284. See id. at 369-73, 381.
285. See Ouelette, supra note 277, at 556, 574 (finding that 64% of nanotechnology
researchers had read patents and 62% of those who had did so to determine whether their own
work was patentable).
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mixed audience thus consumes patent claims, including generalists (judges,
business people, and some individual entrepreneurs), semi-specialists (patent
attorneys and examiners), and skilled people (researchers, technical advisors
to patent attorneys, and individual inventors). Given their divergent back-
grounds and capabilities, the closest that this “community of readers” can
come to a common basis for understanding claim terms is to construe the
claims from the perspective of an ordinary reader and to focus on the sub-
stantive and linguistic clues exclusively provided by the context of the patent
and prosecution history.286
2. Obstacles to an Ordinary Reader Standard
There are three legitimate, though ultimately unpersuasive, concerns
about the ability of a generalist judge to give claim terms the meaning they
would have to an ordinary reader in the context of the patent and prosecution
history: (1) the lack of technical context for technical terms; (2) insufficient
information in the intrinsic record to construe the term; and (3) insufficient
guidance for the judge.
a. Technical Context
An initial objection to an ordinary reader standard for claim construction
is that it takes technical words out of their technical context and therefore
provides an insufficient basis on which to understand technical terms.287 As
an initial matter, scholars have recognized that “[m]ost of the terms the [Fed-
eral Circuit] construes are not technical terms,” but rather ordinary English
words, terms of degree (like “about”), or patentese.288 The dispute in these
cases is not about the general, technical meaning of the term, but instead
how it is being used in the patent. For example, a dispute about the term “a
dosage of about 70 mg” is really about how close to 70 mg the dosage has to
be to fit within what is being disclosed in the patent. In these instances, it is
not the general technical context that is important but the patentee’s descrip-
tion of the dosage in the context of the patent and prosecution history.
Moreover, the patent provides substantial information about the techni-
cal context.289 This technical context is, by definition, in the field, at the skill
level, and near the time of the invention. It also is provided at the earliest
286. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction & The Coordinate Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 251, 254-55 (1990) (advocating textualism in statutory
interpretation because Supreme Court justices’ common understanding of the basic English or
lawyer’s English in which statutes are written provides “a way in which people with poten-
tially divergent views and potentially different understandings of what the context would re-
quire may still be able to agree”).
287. See Osenga, supra note 15, at 101-04.
288. See, e.g., Anderson & Menell, supra note 99, at 68; Burk & Lemley, supra note 16,
at 53; Osenga, supra note 15, at 90.
289. See supra Part I.A.1; see also Cotropia, supra note 35, at 83-85.
Spring 2014] Judicial Capacities & Claim Construction 289
stages of the patenting process (and rarely amended), when knowledge about
how the market will develop and potential competing products is at its low-
est, and therefore when the patentee has the greatest incentive to be forth-
right. The technical context provided in the specification thus is likely to be
more reliable and less biased than technical context derived from extrinsic
sources selected by the parties, or expert testimony prepared for litigation.290
It also is readily available to the court and the public at no cost, unlike
technical context from extrinsic sources (which would require a competitor
ex ante to engage in a costly search of all tangentially relevant sources that a
biased litigant could rely on later) or expert testimony (which is not accessi-
ble or predictable to a competitor ex ante).
The technical context provided in the specification is not perfect—pat-
entees have incentives to include broad and ambiguous statements and hide
key information about the invention.291 But patentees must provide at least
minimal information about the technical context to comply with the disclo-
sure requirements necessary to obtain a patent. Supplementing this informa-
tion with additional technical context from extrinsic sources offers only
speculative gains and definite costs.
On first pass, the fact that the patent is issued, and the claims approved,
by an expert technical agency—the Patent Office—suggests that courts
should attempt to replicate the existing technical context in the field of the
invention to insure the resulting claim scope reflects that issued by the tech-
nically sophisticated Patent Office. However, the Patent Office rules empha-
size that claim terms should be understandable just from the patent itself,
without resort to extrinsic sources of technical context. They provide that
“[t]he meaning of every term used in any of the claims should be apparent
from the descriptive portion of the specification with clear disclosure as to
its import” and that “terms and phrases used in claims . . . [must] find clear
support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the
terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description.”292
As a result, a patent applicant who adds a new claim term not used in the
specification must amend the specification to describe the term.293 Thus,
when a claim construction approach allows extrinsic technical context to
vary the meaning that a reader would discern from the patent itself, it fails to
show due respect for the expert administrative agency that reviews and is-
sues patent claims.
290. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
291. See supra Part I.A.1.
292. MPEP, supra note 38, § 608.01(o) (emphasis added).
293. Id.
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b. Sufficient Information
A related concern is whether the intrinsic record will provide sufficient
information with which an ordinary reader could define the claim term.
Commentators have noted the “anomalous and surprisingly common situa-
tion” where a claim term “appears nowhere in the specification.”294
To satisfy the written description and enablement requirements, a paten-
tee presumably will have to describe all major limitations of the claims in
the specification, even if using different language. If terminology in the
specification is clearly a substitute for a claim term, a court can rely on that
to provide the necessary context for construction.295 Because requiring
judges to engage in this additional step increases decision costs, judicial dis-
cretion, and the risk of errors, a simpler solution is to vigorously enforce the
existing Patent Office regulation that requires patentees to use the same ter-
minology in the specification as the claims. Under this regulation, “the terms
and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in
the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claim may be ascer-
tainable by reference to the description.”296 This requirement can be cheaply
enforced during patent prosecution through text searching and a form rejec-
tion.297 It is unclear why this easy-to-police requirement is not always en-
forced, though it may result from the Federal Circuit’s frequent emphasis on
ordinary meaning over contextual meaning.
A more significant problem is that the patentee will use the claim term
in the specification, but in a cursory, vague, or ambiguous way. The written
description and enablement requirements mitigate this problem, though im-
perfectly.298 Better enforcement of the Patent Office regulations could help,
since they require that the meaning of the claim term “be ascertainable by
reference to the description.”299 During prosecution, the examiner can reject
a claim if the specification does not provide sufficient, or sufficiently clear,
information to understand a claim term. Patentees then would have a power-
ful incentive to provide sufficient information, since an amendment to the
specification that is latter deemed substantive would render any develop-
ments between the filing date and the amendment date prior art that could
invalidate the patent.300 Increased use of the indefiniteness doctrine to invali-
294. Menell et al., supra note 65, at 720.
295. See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App’x. 284, 288 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (noting that “the specification of the patents here does not use the exact phrase
‘power conversion circuit,’” but looking to similar terms in specification like “power source
converter” and “DC/DC converter” to interpret claim term).
296. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) (2013); MPEP, supra note 38, § 608.01(o).
297. See MPEP, supra note 38 § 608.01(o) ¶ 7.44 (providing text of form rejection).
298. See Fromer, supra note 37, at 567-68.
299. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1); see also MPEP, supra note 38, § 608.01(o).
300. See supra Part I.A.3.
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date patents that fail to use or insufficiently describe claims terms would
provide an even more powerful incentive to the patentees.301
Potential shortcomings in the context provided by the specification con-
firm the need to also consult the prosecution history.302 Because statements
in the prosecution history often are made years after filing of the application,
they present an increased risk of strategic behavior by the patentee. Thus,
courts should be suspect of a patentee relying on the prosecution history in
support of a broad claim construction.  On the other hand, during prosecu-
tion, an examiner’s rejection can force the patentee to discuss a particular
claim limitation and particular claim terms and explain what those terms
mean and why they are different than what is described in the prior art refer-
ence relied on by the examiner. The necessity of distinguishing the prior art
to overcome a rejection during prosecution can cause the patentee to use a
claim term in a far more concrete and informative manner than when talking
about the invention in the specification.303
c. Sufficient Guidance
A final concern with an ordinary reader standard is that it provides in-
sufficient guidance to a generalist judge as to how to determine the meaning
of a claim term from the intrinsic record.
Arguably, the specification contains technical information that a gener-
alist judge is not well suited to wade through and understand.304  But history
and experience suggest this is not a substantial barrier to claim construction.
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit’s predecessors regularly con-
strued claims based just on the specification and prosecution history, without
any reference to the skilled person’s perspective or extrinsic evidence.305
301. See In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding claim indefi-
nite that merely “serv[ed] as ‘a shadowy framework’ upon which are located words ‘lacking in
precise referents in the specification’ and requiring ‘elaborate explanations extraneous to both
the specification and the claims’” to construe).  Because the claims define the scope of the
patentee’s rights, they must be sufficiently clear to inform the public of the bounds of the
protected invention; claims that are insolubly ambiguous are invalid as indefinite.  Biosig In-
struments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 897-98 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
302. The concerns that cause some to reject reliance on legislative history in statutory
interpretation are generally not present with the prosecution history.  The prosecution history is
collected by the Patent Office into one file and made conveniently available online at no cost.
Statements by an individual patentee raise no concerns about identifying collective meaning.
And its use raises no concerns analogous to concerns about the constitutional enactment pro-
cess; to the contrary, granting broader patent scope than that understood by the Patent Office
during prosecution raises concerns about the relationship of the Patent Office and courts. See
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
236-37 (2nd ed. 2006).
303. Thanks to Oskar Liivak for suggesting this point with me.
304. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 143-44.
305. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1966); Merrill v. Yeomans,
94 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1877); Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395-14
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
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Of course, patents in the Information Age may be more complex than in
the Industrial Age. However, patent specifications are not entirely technical
disclosures, but rather a mix of legal and technical assertions.306  Many claim
construction disputes turn on the effect of a legal assertion in the specifica-
tion—for example, the effect of a statement that a feature is part of “the
invention,” not “an embodiment”—not the details of the technical disclo-
sure. The judge needs to understand the rules of claim construction, not the
technical disclosure, to resolve these disputes.307
The judge thus can resolve many claim construction disputes by using
basic linguistic canons of construction, such as that terms are used consist-
ently throughout a document, terms are presumed not to be superfluous, and
different words have different meanings.308 The judge does not actually have
to define a claim term. Instead, the judge has to resolve a specific dispute
between the parties about the proper definition.  In many cases, the parties
do not dispute the basic definition of a term—e.g., both sides agree that the
term “board” refers to a flat piece of building material—but dispute whether
the context of the patent provides an additional restriction on the term—e.g.,
one side argues that the “board” additionally must be made of wood.309 To
resolve these type of disputes where one party argues a term means “X” and
the other party argues that patent uses the term to mean “X+Y”, the judge
does not necessarily need a detailed knowledge of the technology—instead,
she must have knowledge of the rules of claim construction and the linguis-
tic canons of construction. As even Professors Wagner and Petherbridge—
critics of contextual meaning—recognize, the task of parsing a legal docu-
ment for clues about the meaning of terminology used elsewhere in the doc-
ument is “uniquely lawyerly in nature,”310 and generalist judges are, of
course, trained lawyers.
Admittedly, situations will arise in which it is not entirely clear whether
a statement in the specification is defining a claim term or just providing an
example, or where the specification uses a claim term broadly in one place
and narrowly in another. In many cases, basic interpretive rules and canons
will dictate a construction. For example, if the term “board” is used in one
place in the specification as referring just to wooden boards and in another
place generically without any indication whether it is limited to wooden
boards or includes other materials, a construction limiting the term to
wooden boards would be consistent with the context. By contrast, if the term
306. See supra Part I.A.1.
307. If necessary, a judge could use a court-appointed expert to obtain a better under-
standing of what is being described in the specification.
308. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 96.
309. Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
310. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 145 (reaching the counterintuitive
conclusion that this “uniquely lawyerly” task is “a relatively poor fit for judges in the modern
patent environment”).
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“board” is used in one place to refer just to wooden boards and in another
place to refer to synthetic boards, the construction of the term “board” must
be broader than just wooden boards. Moreover, clarity as to the exact nature
of the inquiry also will help avoid difficulties in applying this approach.
Probably influenced by the disclosed-invention perspective, contextual
meaning approaches in patent claim construction have sometimes suggested
a broad use of the specification that only requires a vague “textual hook” in
the claims.311 Under the ordinary reader standard proposed here, however,
the specification is used as a dictionary to define a specific claim term and
the focus remains on the usage of that term itself.312
Professor Golden, who also favors abandoning the skilled person’s per-
spective, rejected a similar approach to that proposed here because he con-
cluded that the canons of construction upon which such an approach would
draw are “often conflicting and indeterminate” and that some specific per-
son’s perspective is necessary to “break ties that the [canons] generate.”313
This criticism invokes Karl Llewellyn’s famous critique of “dueling” canons
of statutory interpretation.314 Notably, more recent scholarship has ques-
tioned the power of Llewellyn’s critique, particularly when it comes to ca-
nons reflecting basic rules of syntax or grammar.315  Regardless of the
academic debate, these canons are familiar to judges, who are experienced at
reconciling competing canons.316 Given the extensive textual context pro-
vided by the specification, as compared to the comparatively sparse textual
context of statutes and contracts, a judge will normally have multiple data
points of information, whether textual descriptions or applicable canons,
from which to derive meaning in claim construction. In fact, Professor
Golden’s primary example of the unworkability of an ordinary reader  per-
spective arises from the conflict between the canons that terms must be con-
strued in light of the specification but limitations cannot be imported into the
311. See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App’x. 284, 288 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Novartis Corp. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., Nos. 04-4473(HAA)(ES),
06-1130(HAA)(ES), 2007 WL 1695689, at *12 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) (using claim term
“dose” as hook for requirement of “physical separation” that was expressly recited in other
claims).
312. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see
also, e.g., Lydall Thermal/Acoustical, Inc. v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 344 F. App’x. 607, 615-16
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (focusing on specification’s use of the term “tufts” to construe claim term
“tufts of fiber” as limited by disclosure of specification);  Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’
per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243  (Fed. Cir. 2008) (focusing on specification’s use of claim term
“when” in describing contact of stylus to limit claim based on specification’s description of
time of contact).
313. Golden, supra note 72, at 379.
314. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
315. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statues in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 451-60 (1989).
316. See id. at 452-53.
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claims from the specification.317 As previously explained,318 the conflict in
these canons largely results from the dispute between general and specific
meaning.  The perspective adopted in this Article—that of an ordinary
reader reasoning in the context of the specification—would generally re-
solve these two canons in favor of the first one.
After application of normal interpretive principles and linguistic canons,
indeterminacy undoubtedly will remain in some cases. But criticism of an
ordinary reader standard as indeterminate and pointing in conflicting direc-
tions is unpersuasive. The indeterminacy critique can only be understood in
relative terms—is an ordinary reader approach likely to be more indetermi-
nate than other approaches? Even in situations of conflicting canons or com-
peting descriptions in the specification, the range of possible outcomes under
an ordinary reader standard is likely to be quite narrow, normally binary
(e.g., this statement either defines the term narrowly or is only an example of
a broader definition), and readily apparent from the face of the patent itself.
Thus, to resolve whatever indeterminancy remains under the ordinary reader
standard, a judge need only grapple with the complexities of the patent spec-
ification and accompanying prosecution history.
Other suggested approaches—whether based on the skilled person’s
general understanding, a combination of general and specific meaning, the
identification of the “actual invention,” or Golden’s “patent attorney with
access to the knowledge of an ordinary artisan”—are more complicated, in-
volve more variables, and require consideration of information not apparent
from the face of the patent. For example, under Golden’s approach, the
judge must not only grapple with the complexities of the patent specification
and prosecution history but must additionally reconcile the disclosure of the
patent and prosecution history with the background knowledge and under-
standing of a patent attorney and the background knowledge and under-
standing of a skilled person in the field. The more open-ended and
complicated nature of these other approaches provide good reason to think
that indeterminacy and conflict will be more frequent, with a wider range of
possible outcomes and errors, than under an ordinary reader standard.319
C. The Ordinary Reader Standard and Claim Construction Values
Even if an ordinary reader standard is easier and less error prone for
generalist judges, the question still remains as to how well it promotes the
values thought important in claim construction, primarily predictability and
proportionality. There is good reason to think that an ordinary reader stan-
dard promotes both of these values as well or better than the competing
approaches. An ordinary reader standard thus is desirable regardless of
317. Golden, supra note 72, at 379.
318. See supra Part II.A-B.
319. See Mullally, supra note 87, at 368.
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whether predictability or proportionality is the more important value for
claim construction and offers a way to improve claim construction without
resolving this intractable empirical question.320
1. Predictability
Because conflicting statements in the specification or competing canons
of construction will cause indeterminacy in some cases, claim construction
will retain a measure of unpredictability under an ordinary reader standard.
This unpredictability is likely less problematic than under competing ap-
proaches for three reasons, however.
First, because an ordinary reader approach is simpler and involves fewer
variables than any of the competing approaches, the range of possible con-
structions will be less and will normally result in an “either/or” situation
(this statement in the specification is defining or is exemplary). Likewise,
because the ordinary reader approach limits the inquiry to the public record
of the patent and each of the other approaches requires consideration of a
skilled person’s (or, for Golden, a skilled patent prosecutor’s and a skilled
person’s) background understanding and knowledge, the range of options is
easier for competitors to identify. The unpredictability of the ordinary reader
approach is thus more akin to a “known unknown,” or risk, rather than an
“unknown unknown,” or uncertainty. This type of risk is less costly than the
uncertainty created by the other approaches because it can be planned for
and factored into the cost-benefit analysis when developing a particular
product or taking another course of conduct.321
Second, predictability turns on whether a competitor can predict how a
generalist judge will construe a claim, not just whether the competitor can
understand the claim. The other approaches require the judge to take on the
counterfactual role of a skilled person or skilled patent prosecutor. Even as-
suming these inquiries would be fairly easy for a competitor, they are likely
to be very difficult for a generalist judge, generating errors. As a result, even
if a competitor would be able to understand a claim more easily under an-
other approach, there would be a significant risk that the generalist judge
would not adopt this understanding in later litigation. By contrast, even if an
ordinary reader inquiry is harder for a competitor, it is more likely to lead
the competitor to the same result as the generalist judge.
Third, an ordinary reader standard puts all of the varied consumers of
patent claims on equal footing. Using the perspective of a skilled person or a
skilled patent prosecutor would require other patent claim consumers to un-
dertake the difficult and costly task of trying to understand the skilled person
or prosecutor’s background knowledge and understanding, or risk an errone-
ous prediction if they failed to do so. Although each consumer will bring his
320. See VERMEULE, supra note 29, at 82.
321. See Epstein, supra note 223, at 969.
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or her own background to the interpretive task, they will be united in a com-
mon goal—trying to determine, from the objective public record, what the
patentee was trying to communicate when it chose a particular term.  This
task is consistent with normal principles of communication and interpreta-
tion,322 as well as how skilled people are likely to actually read patents.323
2. Proportionality
Under the ordinary reader standard, a claim term obtains its meaning
solely from the description in the patent and prosecution history, thereby
promoting proportionality between the resulting claim scope and the paten-
tee’s contribution to the field. The important inquiry is whether it does so as
well or better than the disclosed-invention approach. Like that approach, the
ordinary reader standard carries a risk of both overbreadth and underbreadth,
as the court could treat a defining statement in the specification as exem-
plary or an example as definitional.
In theory, the disclosed-invention approach better achieves proportional-
ity. By definition, the disclosed-invention approach construes the claim to be
coextensive with the patentee’s “actual invention.” By contrast, the ordinary
reader approach uses the specification as a dictionary to define a specific
claim term. If the patentee simply omitted a key feature of the invention
from the claim, the disclosed-invention approach still would creatively tailor
the claim language to include this feature, but the ordinary reader approach
would not. The relative proportionality benefits of the two approaches thus
depend on whether the direct focus on the “actual invention” of the dis-
closed-invention approach provides sufficiently greater proportionality to
outweigh its higher error and decision costs.
There is good reason to think it does not. Situations in which the dis-
closed-invention approach would offer greater proportionality—where a
term or feature is completely omitted from a claim—are likely to be compar-
atively rare. The complete omission of a claim or feature from the claim is
exactly the situation in the resulting broad claim scope would be inconsistent
with the disclosure requirements and be invalid. The patentee thus has the
incentive not to completely omit a feature or term but rather to describe it
broadly or vaguely in the claim. But both the disclosed-invention and the
322. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”
Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 986 (2004);
see, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Textualism in Context 7 (July 18, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112384) (associating inter-
pretation with finding “assertive content,” which “is what the speaker actually says by uttering
the expression in the particular context of the speech”).
323. Technical employees or inexperienced technical experts asked to interpret claims
frequently say something like: “I would understand this term to mean X, but I don’t think
that’s how the inventor is using it in this patent.  I think they’re trying to say Y.”
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ordinary reader approach would look to the specification to define and limit
the broad or vague claim term.
The real question may be about when we want to police proportional-
ity—at the claim construction stage or at the invalidity stage through the
disclosure requirements of enablement and written description?324 Those
favoring giving claim terms their general meaning to a skilled person in the
field believe that proportionality should be resolved entirely through invalid-
ity, not claim construction.325 Invalidity alone is likely insufficient to police
proportionality. Many overbroad claims will escape invalidation due to the
presumption of validity and accompanying clear and convincing evidence
standard.326 Moreover, the disclosure requirements necessitate the notori-
ously difficult task of proving a negative: that the specification does not
teach how to make and use the invention or does not show the patentee
possessed the invention. Finally, hindsight bias makes it less likely that
overbroad claims will be invalidated through the enablement or written
description doctrines, as subsequent developments in technology are likely
to make the invention seem easier to build than it was at the time.327
By contrast, the disclosed-invention approach places the entire burden
of policing proportionality on claim construction, since claims that are con-
strued to be limited to the “actual invention” disclosed in the specification
will almost certainly satisfy the enablement and written description require-
ments. In fact, this approach may be motivated by dissatisfaction with the
inadequacies in enablement and written description in policing overbreadth.
This heavy emphasis on proportionality in claim construction greatly in-
creases the difficulty, costs, and errors of claim construction.
The ordinary reader approach described in this Article steers a middle
ground between these two extremes. It gives claim construction a primary,
but not exclusive, role in insuring proportionality, while making claim con-
struction simpler and cheaper. The ordinary reader standard is likely to do a
sufficient job of policing proportionality for most patents, with only the most
egregious examples of disproportionality—such as the complete omission of
a key feature from the claim—surviving claim construction. These are ex-
actly the type of cases that warrant the more costly efforts necessary to en-
sure complete proportionality through the written description and
enablement requirements. Despite their shortcomings, the disclosure require-
ments are likely to be most effective at policing overbreadth when a key
feature of the invention has been completely omitted from the claim, rather
than just vaguely or broadly described.
324. Thanks to Jonathan Masur for raising this point with me.
325. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Moore,
J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
326. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
327. See Mandel, supra note 200, at 1442 (discussing enablement).
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CONCLUSION
Claim construction is hard. “Things are not made for the sake of words,
but words for things.”328 The inherent difficulty in claim construction natu-
rally causes judges and scholars to search for ways to improve this task. But,
in doing so, there is great temptation to focus on idealized theorizing without
giving sufficient consideration to the capacities and performance of the
generalist judges who must implement claim construction. That which is
simple in theory often is difficult in practice.
Each of the major approaches to claim construction—the focus on gen-
eral meaning, the attempt to reconcile general and specific meaning, and the
focus on the disclosed invention—presume that judges can easily implement
the preferred approach. Careful consideration of these approaches suggests
the opposite. These inquiries are open-ended, involve many variables, and
require the judge to undertake the counterfactual role of a scientist. The re-
sult is likely to be significant errors and costs.
To reduce errors and costs, the judge should be assigned the familiar
task of determining how an ordinary reader would understand the claim
term, based just on its substantive and linguistic usage in the patent and
prosecution history. Although some indeterminacy will remain in claim con-
struction, there is little reason to think that more information or a more com-
plicated approach will offer a significant enough improvement to warrant its
costs. An ordinary reader standard may seem inconsistent on first glance
with basic principles of patent law, but it actually promotes consistency with
the relevant technical context and accurately reflects the varied modern con-
sumers of patent claims.
328. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
